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Government Control of Richard
Nixon's Presidential Material
The Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act' directs
the Administrator of the General Services Administration to obtain
control of all of ex-President Nixon's "Presidential historical material"2
and specified tape recordings3 for use in a variety of settings.4 In up-
holding the constitutionality of the Act itself in Nixon v. Administrator
1. 44 U.S.C. § 2107 (Supp. V 1975).
2. Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act of 1974, § 101(b)(1), 44 U.S.C.
§ 2107 (Supp. V 1975). The Act adopts the definition of "historical materials" found in
44 U.S.C. § 2101 (1970) (amending Presidential Libraries Act of 1955, 44 U.S.C. §§ 2107-
2108 (1970)) which includes anything in the President's possession of "historical or com-
memorative value" but is restricted to the period of the Nixon Presidency (Jan. 20, 1969
to Aug. 9, 1974). Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act of 1974, § 101
(b)(1), (2), 44 U.S.C. § 2107 (Supp. V 1975). The GSA has narrowed the coverage of the
Act to exclude Nixon's vice-presidential papers and records of private organizations (such
as the Committee to Re-Elect the President) stored with the government. GENERAL
SERVICES ADMINISTRATION, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON TITLE I OF THE PRESIDENTIAL RECORD-
INGS AND MATERIALS PRESERVATION AcT, at A-4 (March 1975) [hereinafter cited as GSA
REPORT TO CONGRESS]. Thus far the only material seized by the GSA was stored in the
White House or National Archives. Id. at A-3. No attempt has been made to retrieve
"Presidential historical material" that Nixon transported to California following his
resignation. Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 459 n.22 (1977). Material
prepared by the staff of the White House Office has traditionally been controlled by the
President, see note 9 infra, and falls within the scope of the Act. See Nixon v. Sampson,
'16 U.S.L.W. 2529 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 22, 1978) (material belonging to Rose Mary Woods to
be returned pursuant to regulations implementing Presidential Recordings and Materials
Preservation Act rather than independent GSA criteria).
3. Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act of 1974, § 101(a), 44 U.S.C.
§ 2107 (Supp. V 1975). The Act applies to all tapes involving Nixon or other government
employees that were recorded in the White House, the office of the President in the
Executive Office Buildings, Camp David, Maryland, Key Biscayne, Florida, or San
Clemente, California, during the Nixon Presidency. Id.
Recently, in Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 98 S. Ct. 1306 (1978), the Court
held tile existence of provisions in the Act providing for retention and public access to
such tapes to be a crucial factor in determining the absence of a common law right of
access to copies of tapes in the possession of the Federal District Court for the District of
Columbia. Id. at 4325. The Court noted that copies of tapes made after the Nixon
Presidency were not technically within the scope of the Act but stated that the "pres-
ence of an alternative means of public access tips the scales in favor of denying release
[of the copies in the possession of the district court]." Id. The Court's approach shifts
attention to the public access and retention provisions of the regulations implementing the
Act. The Warner Court specifically postponed determination of the "constitutionality and
statutory validity" of any such public access scheme. Id.
4. Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act of 1974, §§ 102, 104, 44
U.S.C. § 2107 (Supp. V 1975). Section 102 of the Act makes the tapes or materials available
for judicial proceedings or "lawful government use" by an executive branch department
or agency, and any use by Nixon consistent with the Act. See note 14 infra. Under § 104
the tapes and materials will be processed for public access. See notes 13 9: 18 infra; pp.
1601-06 inlfra.
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of General Services,5 the Supreme Court approved the initial seizure of
Nixon's presidential material that fell within the scope of the Act., In
the absence of regulations detailing the criteria for permanent reten-
tion of the materials and archival processing standards to segregate
items to be returned to Nixon, the Court declined to decide the con-
stitutional limits on the application of the Act.
7
This Note attempts to define ex-President Nixon's First and Fourth
Amendment rights in his presidential material. These constitutional
claims will limit the government's ability to screen and retain the
material seized under the Act. Part I of the Note examines the past
treatment of presidential material and the provisions of the Presidential
Recordings and Materials Preservation Act. Part II proposes a scheme
for categorizing presidential material and develops a framework for
determining the constitutionally protected interests inherent in the
various categories of material. Part III applies this framework to an
5. 433 U.S. 425 (1977).
6. Congress reasoned that Nixon's presidential materials could be seized and retained
as government property under the property clause, U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2, or as
an exercise of the eminent domain power, U.S. CoNsr. amend. V, cl. 4, because of the
materials' historical value. S. REP. No. 93-1181, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1974); H.R. RE'. No.
93-1507, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1974). The Court in Nixon .'. Administrator of Gen.
Servs. appeared to indicate that either was sufficient ground for seizure and control of
Nixon's material. 433 U.S. at 445 n.8.
For the most part, government control of government property is virtually exempt from
judicial review. See KIeppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 539 (1976) (government power
over public lands is without limitation). Title to presidential papers and materials has
never been formally determined. The Court in Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs.
avoided the question of ownership of presidential material. 433 U.S. at 445 n.8. Attempts
to determine property rights in presidential material have produced conflicting results.
Compare 43 Op. A-r'Y GEN. 1 (1974) (advising that "the papers and other historical
materials which accumulate in the White House Office during the tenure of a President
are the property of that President") with Nixon v. Sampson, 389 F. Supp. 107, 133 (D.D.C.
1975), dismissed as moot, No. 74-1518 (D.D.C. Sept. 21, 1977), appeal docketed, No. 74-
1518 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 18, 1977) (material generated by President or his staff during course
of their official duties held government property) and Reporters Comm. for Freedom of
the Press v. Vance, 442 F. Supp. 383, 387 (D.D.C. 1977), appeal docketed, No. 77-220
(D.C. Cir. Feb. 24, 1978) (tapes of telephone conversations prepared by Secretary of State
Kissinger with use of government personnel, which were essential to conduct of official
business, held government property).
In cases involving eminent domain, congressional judgments regarding "public use"
have included objects of historical value; such judgments will be respected by courts,
unless use is "palpably without reasonable foundation." United States v. Gettysburg Elec.
Ry., 160 U.S. 668, 680-81 (1896). One of the first attempts to use the eminent domain power
to preserve written historical material was the Kennedy Assassination Act of 1965, Pub.
L. No. 89-318, 79 Stat. 1185 (1965). The Act empowered the Attorney General to acquire
"right, title, and interest" and to "preserve" any evidence considered by the Warren Com-
mission. Pursuant to the Act, Lee Harvey Oswald's "personal letters, a diary, family photo-
graphs, marriage license, [and] the contents of [his] wallet" were seized. Porter v. United
States, 335 F. Supp. 498, 500 (N.D. Tex. 1971), rev'd on other grounds, 473 F.2d 1329 (5th
Cir. 1973).
7. See 433 U.S. at 436-39.
1602
Government Control of Presidential Material
analysis of the regulations implementing the Act. The Note concludes
with an examination of the provisions of proposed legislation dealing
with government ownership and retention of presidential material.
I. Past Treatment of Presidential Material and the Presidential
Recordings and Materials Preservation Act
Under the Presidential Libraries Act of 1955,8 a President may de-
posit any of his material with the Archivist of the United States and is
free to set restrictions on access to such material.9 Following his resigna-
tion, Richard Nixon donated his presidential material to the govern-
ment under the provisions of the Presidential Libraries Act.10 The
donation agreement put strict limits on access to the materials and
provided for their selective destruction under Nixon's direction.1 The
Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act abrogates the
terms of Nixon's donation agreement and directs the Administrator of
the General Services Administration to "receive, obtain, or retain,
complete possession and control" of all material originally covered by
the donation agreement. 12 It provides for screening of the seized ma-
terial to determine what material should permanently be retained,
under regulations promulgated by the Administrator and subject to
8. 44 U.S.C. §§ 2107-2108 (1970).
9. Presidents have traditionally maintained control over the disposition of material
produced by them and their staffs while in office. 43 Or. ArTr'Y GEN. 1-3 (1974); National
Study Commission on Records and Documents of Federal Officials, Memorandum of
Findings on Existing Custom or Law, Fact and Opinion 1-24 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
Study Commission Findings]. This has included all the material produced by the White
House Office and stored in the White House "central files," the "non-institutional" files
of the National Security Council, material from White House Office staff files, and
special files maintained by the President. Id. at 29-35; see Nixon v. Administrator of Gen.
Servs., 408 F. Supp. 321, 348 n.34 (D.D.C. 1976), aff'd, 433 U.S. 425 (1977) (materials
produced by the Harding, Pierce, Coolidge, and Arthur administrations may have been
deliberately destroyed).
10. See 10 WEEKLY Comp. OF Pm-s. Doc. 1104-05 (Sept. 16, 1974) [hereinafter cited as
Nixon-Sampson Agreement]. The agreement specifically incorporated the definition of
"historical materials" contained in 44 U.S.C. § 2101 (1970) and covered all such material
in the District of Columbia. Id. at 1104.
11. The agreement provided that all of Nixon's presidential material would be shipped
to a federal depository near his home in California; that Nixon would retain all legal and
equitable title to the material, including literary property rights; and that Nixon would
have an absolute veto over access of any party, including successive administrations, to
the material. After three years, Nixon could withdraw and destroy all documents. After
five years, Nixon could withdraw and destroy all tapes. In any case, all tapes would be
destroyed by September 1, 1984 or at Nixon's death, whichever occurred first. Id. at
1104-05.
12. Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act of 1974, § 101(a), (b), 44
U.S.C. § 2107 (Supp. V 1975). The regulations implementing the Act ensure that
presidential material is secure from any unauthorized access or physical destruction. 42
Fed. Reg. 40,859-60 (1977) (to be codified in 41 C.F.R. §§ 105-63.202 to .204).
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congressional review.'3 Material is to be retained for two distinct pur-
poses: to preserve material for present or future use upon a showing of
"particularized need"'14 and to preserve material of interest to the
public for public access.15 The Act directs the Administrator, in devis-
ing standards for retention and public access, to consider the public's
need to learn the full truth about Watergate,"' Nixon's right to sole
custody of material not related to Watergate or of general historical
significance,' 7 and any legally based right or privilege that would
prevent or limit access to the material.' s
13. Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act of 1974, § 104, 44 U.S.C.
§ 2107 (Supp. V 1975). Although on its face the Act fails to mention who performs the
screening process, it has been generally accepted that Congress contemplated the use of
government archivists experienced in similar reviews of other Presidents' materials. See
Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 408 F. Supp. 321, 339 (D.D.C. 1976), aff'd, 433 U.S.
425 (1977).
14. As used in this Note, "particularized need" refers to a request for specific presiden-
tial material after an examination of available information has established that the
material will more than likely prove of value for the asserted purpose. The language of
the Act and the manner in which it has been construed may permit immediate access to
presidential material by parties other than Nixon only upon a showing of particularized
need: § 102(b) subjects the material to "court subpena or other legal process" conditioned
on the "rights, defenses, or privileges ... any person may invoke"; § 102(d) grants access
to any executive agency or department for "lawful Government use" subject to regulations
on access promulgated by the GSA. Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation
Act of 1974, 44 U.S.C. § 2107 (Supp. V 1975). As the Act has been construed by the Court,
Nixon can assert any constitutional rights or privileges that might prevent use of the
material by an executive agency or department under § 102(d). Nixon v. Administrator of
Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 451 n.13 (1977). Regulations implementing § 102 have been
promulgated, 42 Fed. Reg. 40,859-60 (1977) (to be codified in 41 C.F.R. §§ 105-63.302 to
.303), and executive branch access to material under § 102(d) is permitted only "to the
extent necessary for ongoing Government business." Id. at 40,860 (to be codified in 41
C.F.R. § 105-63.302). Under the regulations governing immediate access, any party other
than the archivists or Nixon is prohibited from gaining access to the material; only
the archivists can examine the material to retrieve the desired documents or recordings.
42 Fed. Reg. 40,859 (1977) (to be codified in 41 C.F.R. § 105-63.204(e)).
15. Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act of 1974, § 104(a), 44 U.S.C.
§ 2107 (Supp. V 1975).
16. Id. § 104(a)(1). The preservation of Watergate material for immediate use in
judicial proceedings and disclosure to the public was the predominant congressional
objective. At the time of its passage, the Senate bill was characterized as an "emergency
measure" to establish protective custody over Watergate material. 120 CONG. REc. 33849
(1974) (Sen. Nelson). The bill as first introduced was directed only at securing control of
the Nixon tapes for use in criminal proceedings and eventual public access. Id. at
31549-50. When the Senate bill was reported out of committee its coverage had been
extended to Nixon's presidential "historical materials" as defined by 44 U.S.C. § 2101
(1970). S. REP. No. 93-1181, suPra note 6, at 1-3.
17. Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act of 1974, § 104(a)(7), 44
U.S.C. § 2107 (Supp. V 1975).
Neither House gave any firm indication of what constituted "historically significant"
material. Floor debate indicates that some type of private or personal material is exempt
from the Act. 120 CONG. Rrc. 33851, 33855 (1974) (Sens. Nelson & Ervin). The predominant
belief seems to have been that only material produced in the course of government business
would be retained. Id. at 33874-76 (1974) (Sens. Huddleston & Ribicoft); see id. at 37904
(1974) (Rep. Abzug urging retention of government material).
18. Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act of 1974, § 104(a)(5), 44
U.S.C. § 2107 (Supp. V 1975). The Court construed the Act to require the Administrator to
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Regulations relating to permanent retention and public access were
submitted to Congress on June 2, 1977, and became effective on
December 16, 1977.19 Under the regulations, the archivists processing
the material are directed to segregate20 "private or personal" material21
from "Presidential historical materials"22 and to transfer the former
to Nixon.2 3 Material that is not "private or personal" and that is not
consider Nixon's constitutional rights, "including his privacy rights," not only in situations
involving access to material but also in situations involving permanent retention of the
material under § 104(a)(7) as well. Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 460
9- n.23 (1977).
19. See 42 Fed. Reg. 63,626-29 (1977) (to be codified in 41 C.F.R. §§ 15-63.104, AO0
to .406). Under § 104(b) of the Act, such regulations had to be submitted to Congress and
would take effect 90 legislative days after submission, unless disapproved by a resolution
adopted by either House. Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act of 1974,
§ 104(b), 44 U.S.C. § 2107 (Supp. V 1975). This mechanism for congressional approval of
agency rule-making, popularly known as the "legislative veto," has been used with in-
creasing frequency in recent years. Bruff & Gellhorn, Congressional Control of Administra-
live Regulation: A Study of Legislative Vetoes, 90 HARv. L. REv. 1369, 1370-71 (1977). With
regard to § 104 of the Act, Congress rejected the first three sets of regulations proposed
by the Administrator. Id. at 1397-1403 (discussing congressional treatment of proposed
regulations).
The Court has yet to rule on the constitutionality of the "legislative veto." In his com-
plaint challenging the constitutionality of the regulations, Nixon contends that all regu-
lations promulgated pursuant to § 104(b) are unconstitutional and void because § 104(b)
"constitutes an unlawful delegation of legislative power to one House of Congress" and
"violates Article I of the Constitution and the Separation of Powers doctrine ...." Second
Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 5-6, Nixon v. Solomon, No.
77-1395 (D.D.C., filed Jan. 31, 1978) [hereinafter referred to as Nixon's Amended Com-
plaint]. In its answer to Nixon's complaint, the Government conceded the unconstitu-
tionality of the legislative veto and regulations passed in accordance with such a pro-
cedure. Answer at 2 ff 14, Nixon v. Solomon, No. 77-1395 (D.D.C., filed Jan. 31, 1978)
[hereinafter referred to as Government's Answer]. Although The Reporters Committee
for Freedom of the Press has recently intervened and is defending the constitutionality
of the legislative veto, Nixon v. Solomon, No. 77-1395 (D.D.C. June 9, 1978) (order grant-
ing motion to intervene), it should be noted that the Government's concession only per-
tains to the constitutionality of the manner in which the regulations were formulated.
As for the substantive provisions of the regulations, the Government contested the ma-
jority of Nixon's allegations of unconstitutionality. In only two instances did the Gov-
ernment concede the unconstitutionality of the substantive provisions of the regulations:
the Government agreed with Nixon that both the membership provisions of the Presi-
dential Materials Review Board permitting non-executive branch employees to review
presidential material, 42 Fed. Reg. 63,627 (1977) (to be codified in 41 C.F.R. § 105-63AO-
2(g)), and the referral provisions requiring archivists to report to the Justice Depart-
ment evidence of criminal conduct, id. (to be codified in 41 C.F.R. § 105-63A01-2(d)), were
unconstitutional. Government's Answer, sulpra at 3 ff 18, 4 23. For a discussion of the
referral provisions, see note 118 infra. If § 104(b) were found to be unconstitutional and
separable from the Act under the separability clause contained in § 105(b), the major
provisions of the regulations could be reenacted without congressional participation in a
more traditional manner. If § 104(b) were held not to be separable, Congress could amend
the Act to accord with constitutional rule-making procedures.
20. 42 Fed. Reg. 63,627 (1977) (to be codified in 41 C.F.R. § 105-63.401-2(a)).
21. Id. at 63,626 (to be codified in 41 C.F.R. § 105-63.104(b)) (defining "private or
personal materials").
22. Id. (to be codified in 41 C.F.R. § 105-63.104(a)) (defining "Presidential historical
materials").
23. Id. at 63,628 (to be codified in 41 C.F.R. § 105-63A01-5(a) to -5(c)).
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Watergate related or of general historical significance will also be re-
turned to Nixon.2 4 Access restrictions to material retained by the
government are to be devised by the Administrator.
2 5
II. Constitutionally Protected Interests in Presidential Material
A. Categorizing Privacy Interests in Presidential Material
Presidential material can be divided into two broad categories:
"public" and "private" material. Material is considered "private" be-
cause of the context in which it was produced rather than the particular
information it contains..2 6 Material not originating from the President's
public role as Chief Executive, head of his political party, or other
public capacity, is considered private.27 This approach protects the full
scope of those activities of the President generally recognized as private,
such as his role as father, husband, friend, or diarist,2 as well as other
24. Id. Screening of the material has begun and is expected to take approximately three
years at an estimated cost of $7,109,600. GSA REPORT TO CoNGRESs, suPra note 2, at F-3.
Pending Nixon's suit challenging the constitutionality of the regulations, see note
19 supra and note 103 inIra, archivists have been directed to begin preliminary processing
for the purpose of "preserving and establishing intellectual control of the Nixon historical
materials." National Archives and Records Service, Preliminary Archival Processing of the
Nixon Historical Materials 1 (Apr. 17, 1978). This includes developing "general descrip-
tions of the contents" of the material, id., duplicating original tapes, id. at 2, and tenta-
tively identifying materials that are personal or not of general historical interest for
eventual transfer to Nixon, id. at 3-4.
25. 42 Fed. Reg. 63,628-29 (1977) (to be codified in 41 C.F.R. § 105-63.402). It is un-
clear whether the access scheme devised by the Administrator will be the sole means for
gaining public review of the Nixon material. The Act states that public access provisions
shall not affect the "rights, limitations or exemptions" applicable under the Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976). Presidential Recordings and Materials
Preservation Act of 1974, § 104(d), 44 U.S.C. § 2107 (Supp. V 1975); see Nixon v. Sampson,
No. 74-1518, slip op. at 3, 4 & nn.6-8 (D.D.C. Sept. 21, 1977) (suggesting that access scheme
under Act prevails over "general scheme of FOIA").
26. This distinction between the content of the material and the private or public
nature of the activity from which it originated finds support in the Court's development
of libel law. The movement of Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), away from
a public interest or "newsworthiness" test to a public-private figure standard has required
an examination of the "nature and extent of an individual's participation in the
particular controversy giving rise to the defamation." Id. at 352. Thus an individual may
be involved in a matter of great public interest yet still be acting in a private capacity.
See Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 453-54 (1976); cf. Note, The Editorial Function
and the Gertz Public Figure Standard, 87 YALE L.J. 1723 (relevance of "public interest"
to public-private figure determination).
27. Cf. Warren . Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv. 193, 215-16 (1890)
("some things all men alike are entitled to keep from popular curiosity, whether in public
life or not"; even men acting in public capacity maintain core of private activities).
28. See Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 459 (1977) (recognizing
Nixon's privacy claim regarding communications with his "'wife, his daughters, his
physician, lawyer, and clergyman, his close friends, as well as personal diary dictabelts
and his wife's personal files' ") (quoting Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 408 F. Supp.
321, 359 (D.D.C. 1976)); id. at 460. For a more detailed account of Nixon's "private
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associations, such as physician-patient and attorney-client, traditionally
accorded private status under common law.29 Material created in these
situations would not have to deal solely with nonpublic affairs in order
to be considered private. For example, taped conversations between
Nixon and his wife concerning his conduct in office would qualify as
private material; what is at issue is the private act of husband and wife
communicating.
In situations involving interpersonal exchanges, conversations, cor-
respondence, or memoranda, the "private" or "public" nature of the
material can be determined by identifying the status of the parties to
the interchange and examining the contents of the material to the
extent necessary to verify whether the individuals are acting in a private
or public capacity.!, Private interpersonal exchanges may involve in-
material" see Brief for Appellant at 144-46, Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433
U.S. 425 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Appellant's Brief]; cf. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S.
64, 77 (1964) (public's interest in government official extends only to information which
"might touch" on "fitness for office").
29. When considering whether exchanges fall within a traditionally recognized privilege,
e.g., attorney-client, the context of the interchanges must be examined in order to
determine whether the elements requisite to such a privilege exist. For example, Nixon
claims that all communications between himself and attorneys serving as White House
counsel fall under the attorney-client privilege and should be returned to him as private
material. Interview with R. Stan Mortenson, Miller, Cassidy, Larroca & Lewin (Attorneys
for Nixon) (June 5, 1978) (notes on file with Yale Law Journal). It is widely recognized
that the privilege only extends to situations in which a lawyer-client relationship exists, 8
J. WIGMoRE, EviDENC. § 2304 (3d ed. 1940), and the client has sought advice concerning
his rights or liabilities, id. § 2303. Attorneys serving as White House counsel may render
advice to the President on legal issues arising from policy implementation, e.g., constitu-
tionality of warrantless wiretapping of foreign agents, or the President's own rights or
liabilities, e.g., tax obligations. In the latter instance the relationship between President
and counsel most closely parallels typical attorney-client interaction, and application of
the privilege would be appropriate. To apply the privilege to communications between
the President and White House attorneys regarding the official duties of the Presidency,
however, would ignore the policy underlying lawyer-client confidentiality: ensuring full
and open disclosure of the client's case. E. CL.ARY, McCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAw
OF EVIDENCE 175-76 (2d ed. 1972). Confidentiality for official communications between the
President and White House counsel is better derived from the constitutionally based
doctrine of executive privilege. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705-06, 708 (1974).
In Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., the Court rejected the argument of the non-
federal appellees that only an incumbent President could assert executive privilege and
held that Nixon could raise such a claim under § 104(a)(5) of the Act. 433 U.S. at 447-51.
A claim of executive privilege, however, would affect only the disclosure of presidential
material, not its retention by the government. By definition, material falling under an
executive privilege would qualify as government property. See note 100 infra; United
States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 708, 711 (1974) (executive privilege limited to communica-
tions made "in the process of shaping policies and making decisions" during performance
of presidential duties). Retention of this material, with access regulated as may be con-
stitutionally required, would not infringe Nixon's First and Fourth Amendment interests.
See pp. 1618-20, 1624, 1626-28 infra.
30. In some instances members of the President's family may operate in a public
capacity. See Deposition of Richard Nixon, Appellant's Appendix at 603-04, Nixon v.
Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Appellants Ap-
pendix] (Nixon considered conversations with his wife concerning her good will trips
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dividuals who have previously maintained private relationships with
the President and continue to act in their traditional private capacity,
or individuals having no prior relationship with the President who
have assumed recognizable private roles in his life. Conversely, when
the President interacts with aides, public officials, or national leaders,
thus performing his duties as Chief Executive3' or head of his party,
32
or engages in other activities unrelated to his private life, these would
be considered public matters.
Private material may also be created when the President, during the
conduct of government business or party affairs, documents his own
observations, ideas, or emotions in a confidential format never in-
tended to be circulated to other individuals. This would be the case
with diaries or other "intrapersonal" material.3 3 Such material would
be identifiable from its outside packaging and a limited examination of
its contents.
abroad, her activity in "The Right to Read Program" and "White House restoration
project" to be "official conversations").
In most cases involving presidential material, a judgment regarding the private or public
nature of the activity can be made on a document-by-document basis. The judgment de-
pends on the general impression the document conveys: personal greetings in a memoran-
dum between the President and his aide concerning Arab-Israeli negotiatiqns do not turn
the document into "private" material. Cf. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press v.
Vance, 442 F. Supp. 383, 387 (D.D.C. 1977), appeal docketed, No. 77-220 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 24,
1978) ("Although personal in some respects ... [records] transcribed in the discharge of
*.. official duties... are property of the United States.") The White House tapes present
a special problem. Because they ran continuously, they contain a mix of private and public
activity. Thus, categorizing privacy interests in the White House tapes involves an exami-
nation of a series of distinct interchanges, each beginning and ending as the participants
change. In addition, the participants may change capacities during the course of a taped
encounter. Appellant's Brief, supra note 28, at 22-23. As in the case of written material, the
transition from public to private capacity, or vice versa, requires a material change in the
nature of the participant's conduct.
31. See Affidavit of Richard Nixon in Appellant's Appendix, supra note 30, at 171-73
(certain presidential activity relates to official conduct of office). Since "public material"
consists of material generated in the performance of presidential duties, the proposed
categorization adopts the statutory standard that has been applied to determine the
status of material produced by executive branch officials other than the President or his
staff. Material made or received by the employees of an agency "in connection with the
transaction of public business" is retainable as an agency record. 44 U.S.C. § 3301 (1970).
32. This position requires the President to supervise the general affairs of the national
party he represents as well as his own immediate campaign organization. J. BURNS,
PRESIDENTIAL GOVERNMENT 159-71 (1966). In the case of the Nixon Presidency, both types
of political activity were embodied in recordings of "political briefings and strategy ses-
sions conducted in Mr. Nixon's offices or over his telephones," Appellant's Brief, supra note
28, at 167-68, in political "briefing books" describing local political officials and their
positions on various issues, id. at 164-65, and in memoranda prepared by White House
staff for use in Nixon's 1972 election, Appellant's Appendix, supra note 30, at 569.
33. "[T]he. former President's own personal evening reflections and judgments on
political candidates and issues" were among material seized under the Act. Appellant's
Brief, supra note 28, at 168.
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B. Constitutionally Protected Interests in Presidential Material
1. First Amendment Interests
First Amendment protection has long been extended beyond its
central purpose of preventing direct government controls on speech
itself. When governmental actions intrude upon or deter the exercise
of activity protected by the First Amendment, the Court has recognized
a limited sphere of First Amendment privacy-a right to withhold pro-
tected information from the government.34 Congressional seizure of
presidential papers and materials for preservation and disclosure creates
the potential for two distinct types of First Amendment privacy claims.
a. Privacy Interests in "Intrapersonal Speech"
Some presidential material records what this Note defines as Nixon's
intrapersonal speech: his recollections, opinions, thoughts, and beliefs
that were never intended to be disclosed to other individuals or the
general public without his prior approval. Thus Nixon's dictabelt
diaries and similar material containing his private thoughts concern-
ing national issues or political affairs35 are examples of intrapersonal
speech.
In the past when the government has attempted to uncover an in-
dividual's ideas, beliefs, or viewpoints, the Court has emphasized that
such activity violates the privacy of thought protected by the First
Amendment.3" This concept of a sphere of privacy for mental activity
is consistent with the view that freedom of expression includes the right
to form and hold beliefs and to decide when and where they will be
disclosed to the public.37 This translates into the notion that an in-
dividual's thoughts are his own; government intrusion into this fragile
34. E.g., Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 485-87 (1960) (compelled disclosure of group
membership violates right of association); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462-63 (1958)
(same); Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 197 (1957) (compelled testimony may
threaten First Amendment rights). But see Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 11-13 (1972) (direct
injury needed to establish First Amendment violation).
35. See note 33 suPra.
36. Schneider v. Smith, 390 U.S. 17, 19-20, 20 n.2, 24-27 (1968). In Schneider, the Court
construed a statute governing the validation of merchant marine licenses to prevent
government probing into the "reading habits, political philosophy, beliefs, and attitudes
on social and economic issues of prospective seamen." Id. at 24. The Court emphasized
that the First Amendment creates "a preserve where the views of the individual are made
inviolate." Id. at 25; see American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 421 (1950)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring in part) ("probing into men's thoughts trenches on those
aspects of individual freedom which we rightly regard as the most cherished aspects of
Western civilization"); id. at 442 (Jackson, J., concurring in part) (legislation cannot "em-
barrass or impede the mere intellectual processes by which . . . expressions of belief are
examined and formulated").
37. T. EMERSON, TuE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 3, 21-22, 30-32 (1970).
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area of speech, without some compelling need, would amount to un-
constitutional action.38
b. Privacy Interests in Associational Activity
In Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, Nixon argued that
certain material contained information concerning his political affilia-
tions within the Republican Party and that seizure of this information
violated his First Amendment right of associational privacy.39 Organiz-
ing or associating with others for the advancement of political or social
goals has been recognized as activity protected by the First Amend-
ment.40 At the same time, the Court has made it clear that an associa-
tional privacy claim requires a showing that the government conduct
in question will deter future associational activity or otherwise destroy
the effectiveness of a political organization. 41 This can result from
disclosure of information to the public if deterrence is likely to
follow,42 or use of the material to produce a "'chilling' . . . effect...
that fall[s] short of a direct prohibition against the exercise of First
Amendment rights. '43 Mere government seizure of presidential ma-
terial representing associational activity, with disclosure or use of the
material delayed until the possibility of deterrence or chill no longer
existed, would not appear to infringe First Amendment interests.44
38. Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 197-200 (1957) (exposure of individual's be-
liefs or associations, without some compelling government interest, may amount to un-
constitutional action).
39. Appellant's Brief, supra note 28, at 164-68. See also Plaintiff's Brief In Support of
Claim for Permanent Injunctive and Declaratory Relief at 150-52, Nixon v. Administrator
of Gen. Servs., 408 F. Supp. 321 (D.D.C. 1976), aff'd, 433 U.S. 425 (1977) [hereinafter cited
as Plaintiff's Brief].
40. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 15 (1976); Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 56-57 (1973).
41. California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 56-57, 75-76 (1974); see Note, The
Constitutional Right to Anonymity: Free Speech, Disclosure and The Devil, 70 YALE L.J.
1084, 1105-13 (1961) (concept of "deterence through disclosure").
42. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 74 (1976) (First Amendment protection extended where
claimants can establish "reasonable probability" that they would be subject to threats
from government or private parties); see NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958)
(record established that members of plaintiff organization would be subject to physical
reprisals if disclosure occurred).
43. Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 11 (1972) (dictum).
44. See id. at 10 (no First Amendment chill produced by "mere existence, without
more" of broad governmental investigative and data-gathering activity). In addition to
the Court's analysis of First Amendment claims in Buckley, Laird, and Shultz, see United
States v. Finance Comm. to Re-Elect the President, 507 F.2d 1194, 1199-1200 (D.C. Cir.
1974) (First Amendment challenge to Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 premature
until organization establishes that deterrence will result from disclosure of contributions).
For an example of a case where the claimant made the requisite showing of objective harm,
see Pollard v. Roberts, 283 F. Supp. 248, 256-58 (E.D. Ark.), aff'd, 393 U.S. 14 (1968) (per
curiam) (Republican Party of Arkansas had First Amendment standing to prevent dis-
closure of bank records of campaign contributors and contributions when disclosure might
deter participation in Republican activities).
Of course, seizure and processing of the material would result in the disclosure of some
information to the individuals implementing the collection scheme. However, so long as
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2. Fourth Amendment Interests
To define Nixon's Fourth Amendment interests in his presidential
material, one must determine, first, which materials are protected and
second, how much protection each receives.
a. The Scope of Fourth Amendment Protection
In scrutinizing government searches and seizures, the Court has
examined whether the claimant had a legitimate expectation of privacy
in the material in question.45 This amounts to a reasonable belief that
the material will remain free from uninvited examinations or seizures.
46
The Presidential Libraries Act specifically granted Presidents exclu-
sive control over their presidential material.47 Since past Presidents had
excluded 48 or had had the opportunity-to exclude4 9 all types of presi-
trained archivists handled the material and safeguards existed to prevent the dissemina-
tion of potentially damaging material to other entities within the government, First
Amendment interests would still not be violated. Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs.,
433 U.S. 425, 466-67 (1977) (adopting view of district court that review by "professional
and discreet archivists" raises "speculative" burden with regard to First Amendment
claims).
45. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 9-11, 13 n.8, 13-14 (1977). In a recent case,
the Court has indicated that the principle concern of the Fourth Amendment is intrusions
on personal privacy during the course of criminal investigations. See Whalen v. Roe, 429
U.S. 589, 604 n.32 (1977) (right of privacy emanating from Fourth Amendment derived
from cases involving "affirmative, unannounced, narrowly focused intrusions into in-
dividual privacy during the course of criminal investigations"). Such an emphasis on the
connection between the Fourth Amendment and criminal investigations, however, ignores
the Court's willingness to find Fourth Amendment privacy interests at stake in situations
involving broad governmental searches unrelated to criminal law enforcement. See note
64 infra; Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 98 S. Ct. 1816 (1978) (Fourth Amendment applies
"during civil as well as criminal investigations"; "privacy interest suffers whether the
government's motivation is to investigate violations of criminal laws or breaches of other
statutory or regulatory standards"). Recognizing the applicability of the Fourth Amend-
ment to government searches or seizures, whether or not for criminal law enforcement
purposes, is consistent with the notion "that the real evil aimed at by the Fourth Amend-
ment is the search itself, that invasion of a man's privacy which consists in rummaging
about among his effects . ... " United States v. Poller, 43 F.2d 911, 914 (2d Cir. 1930) (L.
Hand, J.).
46. See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 9-11, 13 n.7, 13-14 (1977).
47. See p. 1603 supra; Presidential Libraries Act of 1955, 44 U.S.C. §§ 2107-2108 (1970).
48. Presidents or their families have retained control over material produced in the
course of presidential duties for long periods of time after leaving office. NATIONAL STUDY
COMMISSION ON RECORDS AND DOCUMENTS OF FEDERAL OFFICIALS, MAJORITY REPORT 16
(1977) [hereinafter cited as MAJORITY R-PORT]. The Kennedy family, for example, con-
trolled tape recordings of official conversations for approximately 12 years after the
President's death before donating them to the government. Letter from Dan H. Fenn,
Jr., Director of John F. Kennedy Library (undated) (on file with Yale Law Journal). In
addition, the record in the Nixon case indicates that the material of some Presidents, e.g.,
Harding's papers relating to the "Teapot Dome" scandal, may have been deliberately
destroyed. See note 9 supra.
49. Donation agreements made under the Presidential Libraries Act have consistently
given Presidents or their personal representatives the right to determine which material
relates to public activity and is to be transferred to the government. Appellant's Appen-
dix, supra note 30, at 79-101.
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dential material-public and private-from donations made under the
Presidential Libraries Act, and an express statutory guarantee per-
mitted this behavior, Nixon could reasonably claim an expectation of
privacy regarding his presidential material.50
The Court in Nixon v. Administrator of General Services acknowl-
edged Nixon's privacy interest in private material and used the "rea-
sonable expectation of privacy" test to reach that result.," Because past
Presidents had maintained control over material relating to family
matters and personal finances, Nixon had a "legitimate expectation of
privacy" for similar material of his own.
52
But the Court ignored any Fourth Amendment interest in public
material. 53 Such an exception for this material seems unjustified. 4
Paradoxically, the Court refused to acknowledge Nixon's "legitimate
expectation" that he would be able to do what the Act clearly author-
50. In part, Nixon's ability to assert a valid Fourth Amendment claim to his
presidential material rests upon the timing of the congressional seizure. Prospective
legislation establishing government control of certain material, e.g., interpersonal material
produced during performance of presidential duties, would establish the type of prior
notice usually held to defeat a Fourth Amendment claim. See Wilson v. United States, 221
U.S. 361, 380-81 (1911) (corporation president could not claim Fourth Amendment interest
in corporate records for which he was custodian). Prior notice, however, could not ex-
tinguish Fourth Amendment interests in intrapersonal material created in connection with
the President's public activity. As one commentator has noted, the expectation-of-privacy
approach cannot be used as a device to circumvent significant privacy interests by giving
prior notice of unconstitutional government activity. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the
Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REv. 349, 384 (1974).
51. 433 U.S. at 457-58.
52. Id. The Court went so far as to add that this expectation of privacy was inde-
pendent of the question of ownership of the material, thereby employing the con-
temporary concept that expectations of privacy transcend property interests. Id.; see Katz
v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967).
53. See 433 U.S. at 457-60. The Court seemed to suggest that because past Presidents
had eventually donated everything but family material, Nixon had no reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy with regard to control of any public material. Id. at 457 & n.19. This was
the explicit reasoning of the lower court. 408 F. Supp. at 358 & n.53, 359.
54. The record in the case makes it clear that Presidents have maintained unilateral
control over their material until donation. See notes 9 & 49 supra. More importantly, in
discussing privacy interests in family material, the Court stated that Nixon's expectation
of privacy was not dependent on the past practices of Presidents. 433 U.S. at 458 n.20. Thus
the Court's statement suggests that even if past Presidents had refused to maintain
exclusive control of their material prior to donation, other factors, such as the Libraries
Act, see p. 1603 & note 8 supra, could serve as an independent basis for Nixon's expecta-
tions of privacy.
The Court also suggested an alternate ground for limiting Nixon's Fourth Amendment
claim: Fourth Amendment protection could only extend to those items Nixon saw. 433
U.S. at 459. Nixon conceded that he only had knowledge of 200,000 documents, but, con-
trary to the Court's implication, id., he never claimed his Fourth Amendment rights were
limited to this body of material. Appellant's Brief, supra note 28, at 141-64. In the past the
Court has not required the claimant to have actual knowledge of the seized material in
order to raise a Fourth Amendment claim. See Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165,
176 (1969) (individual had Fourth Amendment interest in conversations in his home even
though not present at time communications were made and recorded).
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ized him to do: protect part or all of the public material in his presi-
dential papers from government retention and public access.
The refusal of the Court to recognize the full extent of Nixon's
Fourth Amendment interests allows Congress to retain certain presi-
dential material without being subject to judicial review. The Court
exempted from Fourth Amendment protection a vast quantity of
material originally prepared and stored subject to an entirely reason-
able belief that its disclosure would only occur with presidential ap-
proval. A more appropriate resolution of the issue would acknowledge
Nixon's Fourth Amendment interest in all presidential material, except
for material Nixon deliberately released to individuals outside the
executive branch, such as members of CongTess or the general public.5
b. The Degree of Fourth Amendment Protection
Even if Fourth Amendment protection extends to a particular
item, immunity from government seizure is not absolute. The Fourth
Amendment forbids only "unreasonable" searches and seizures: the
amendment seeks to strike an appropriate balance between an in-
dividual's need for privacy and the government's need for informa-
tion.' 6
It is well established that the legislature is bound by the Fourth
Amendment when prescribing administrative searches or seizures; the
government must make a showing of need sufficient to meet Fourth
Amendment standards.57 That the Court in Nixon v. Administrator of
55. In Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), the Court indicated in dictum that an
individual could not maintain a reasonable expectation of privacy in material he "know-
ingly exposes to the public." Id. at 351. When applying this "knowing disclosure" doctrine
to presidential material, a distinction must be made between exposure of material to
executive branch employees during the course of Nixon's Presidency and exposure to the
general public. The crux of the "knowing disclosure" rationale is that material must be
so accessible to the public that any individual can gain familiarity with its contents. Cf.
Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 212-13 (1966) (Brennan, J., concurring) (individual's
home was open to anyone willing to enter). Material produced by the President and his
advisers is exempted from the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act. CONF. REP.
No. 93-1200, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 15, reprinted in [19 74 ] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
6285, 6293 (Congress did not intend to expand agency definition in 5 U.S.C. § 552(c)
(1976) to include "President's immediate personal staff" or units in Executive Office with
sole function to "advise and assist the President"). Moreover, Congress does not have
wholesale access to presidential material to expose it to the public. Senate Select Comm.
on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 498 F.2d 725, 731-33 (D.C. Cir. 1974). It
would appear then that unless certain material was voluntarily thrust into the public
domain by Nixon, the "knowing disclosure" doctrine is inapplicable.
56. See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 554 (1976) (Fourth Amendment
limits search and seizure powers to prevent "arbitrary and oppressive interference" with
personal privacy); Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 400 (1976) (dictum) (framers of
Constitution addressed subject of personal privacy "directly in Fourth Amendment" and
balanced invasion of privacy against state's interest in uncovering incriminating evidence).
57. Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 272 (1973).
1613
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 87: 1601, 1978
General Services upheld the initial seizure of Nixon's presidential
material does not mean such standards are not applicable to the sub-
sequent search and retention of material. 5s
The predominant element of Fourth Amendment protection is a
reasonableness test that requires "balancing the need to search (or
seize) against the invasion [of privacy] which the search (or seizure)
entails." 59 The Court has recognized that this reasonableness balance
derives much of its content and meaning from the warrant clause and
the history of the amendment. 60 Thus, the Court has required that the
scope and subject matter of a government search or seizure be specif-
ically described0 and that an objective, judicially reviewable showing
that the search or seizure is justified in light of the asserted govern-
ment interest be made.62 These elements ensure that there is a reason-
58. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 15 (1977) (once exigent circumstances
justifying relaxation of Fourth Amendment safeguards no longer exist, normal Fourth
Amendment standards must be met).
In justifying the sweeping seizure of Nixon's presidential material, the Court em-
phasized that material in which Nixon had legitimate privacy interests and which would
eventually be returned was commingled with material relevant to the government's ob-
jectives. 433 U.S. at 462-65. Alluding to the provisions of the Nixon-Sampson Agreement,
supra note 10, giving Nixon the right to selectively destroy material, see notes 10 & 11
supra, and the need to segregate private material in a disinterested manner, the Court
rejected Nixon's claim that he alone should process the material as a less restrictive alterna-
tive, 433 U.S. at 464 n.25. In Fourth Amendment terms, these facts represent the kind of
exigent circumstances ordinarily justifying a relaxation of Fourth Amendment protections.
Once all the material is in government hands and exigent conditions no longer exist,
Nixon's right to Fourth Amendment protection must be respected.
59. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1968) (quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387
U.S. 523, 534-37 (1967)). For a general discussion of the balancing approach to Fourth
Amendment protection, see Greenberg, The Balance of Interests Theory and the Fourth
Amendment: A Selective Analysis of Supreme Court Action Since Camara and See, 61
CAL. L. Rv. 1011 (1973).
60. See United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 309-10 (1972). In
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 760-65, 768 (1969), the Court first adopted Justice Frank-
furter's dissent in United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 83 (1950), in which he stated
that the "test of reason" for a reasonable search was adherence to the tradition underlying
the probable cause/warrant elements of the Fourth Amendment. Id.
61. This emphasis on specificity of the search or seizure is consistent with the origins
of the Fourth Amendment. See N. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURrH
AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 42-103 (1937). As Lasson points out, the
Fourth Amendment was developed in response to the hated "general warrants" and "writs
of assistance" used by the British. Id. at 79-103. The general warrants and writs of
assistance gave complete discretion to the authorities conducting the search: no chargeable
offense was indicated, and no description of the materials to be seized, or places to be
reached, was presented. See, e.g., Entick v. Carrington, 95 Eng. Rep. 807, 816-18, 19
Howell's St. Trials 1030, 1034, 1063-64, 1067 (1765).
The Court has consistently recognized that a chief purpose of the Fourth Amendment
is to protect against general searches. See, e.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443,
467 (1971); Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 56-60 (1967); Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476,
481-86 (1965).
62. An important purpose of the warrant clause is to ensure that the need to search
or seize is subject to review by an impartial party. See Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 98
S. Ct. 1816, 1826 (1978) (warrant necessary to "provide assurances from a neutral officer"
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able need to search and that the search will promote the government
interest. Depending on the purpose and nature of the search, 63 various
degrees of particularity and objectivity have been required. The Court
has attempted to accommodate these standards so as not to defeat
legitimate state interests differing from traditional law enforcement
objectives. 4 But at the same time, these standards have been enforced
with greater rigor as the government intrusion on an individual's
privacy increases. 65
that inspection pursuant to Occupational Safety and Health Act is "reasonable under
the Constitution, is authorized by statute, and is pursuant to an administrative plan con-
taining specific neutral criteria"). But even when circumstances render it impossible to
secure a warrant, the Court has still required government action to be premised on an
objective showing of need. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-31 (1968). Searches or seizures
based on the "subjective good faith" of the government agent are to be guarded against.
See Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 97 (1964).
63. When the legislature mandates searches or seizures for purposes of criminal law
enforcement, such activity must meet Fourth Amendment particularity and probable
cause standards. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 63-64 (1967); Carroll v. United States,
267 U.S. 132, 155-57, 160-61 (1925).
64. The Court's most recent attempt to balance such legislatively mandated searches
against Fourth Amendment safeguards is Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 98 S. Ct. 1816, 1819-26
(1978) (warrantless inspection of "ordinary'--as opposed to traditionally federally licensed-
business pursuant to § 8(a) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 violated
Fourth Amendment; however, warrant need not meet "probable cause [standard] in the
criminal law sense" and may be based on "general administrative plan for ... enforcement
of the Act").
For other cases involving searches or seizures outside of a criminal law context, see
United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 312 n.l, 315-17 (1972) (warrantless search to enforce
Gun Control Act of 1968 reasonable in light of limited scope, time, and place of search
and closely regulated status of industry); Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 320-21, 323-24,
326 (1971) (warrantless home inspection pursuant to state welfare law requiring written
notice and prohibiting forcible entry, "snooping in the home," or compulsory participa-
tion is "reasonable administrative tool" and violates no Fourth Amendment rights);
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 530-34, 538-39 (1967) (inspection of residences
for housing code violations requires warrant that meets general administrative standards
for conducting area inspections).
Cases involving Fourth Amendment claims against the seizure of material through the
use of administrative or congressional subpoenas represent a special segment of Fourth
Amendment law. Fourth Amendment protection in this area is minimal at best. See
McPhaul v. United States, 364 U.S. 372, 382-83 (1960) (congressional subpoena need not
identify requested material in detail; requesting subcommittee not required to "know
precisely what books and records" were kept by defendant). This reduction in Fourth
Amendment protection can be explained because procedures exist to permit the in-
dividual to challenge the subpoena in court through a motion to quash. See In Re
Horowitz, 482 F.2d 72, 74-75 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 867 (1973). The type of
government activity at issue in the Nixon case, however, involves an active seizure and
search of material, making any comparison with Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in
the subpoena cases unprofitable.
65. Compare United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 320-21 (1972)
(when government activity intrudes on First and Fourth Amendment privacy values,
Fourth Amendment requires warrant issued by impartial magistrate to ensure intrusion is
justified) with Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 537 (1967) (because housing code
inspections involve limited invasion of privacy and are neither personal nor aimed at
collecting evidence, attenuated probable cause standard sufficient to guard against un-
authorized entry into home). This relationship between the degree of Fourth Amendment
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In addition to applying standards of objectivity and particularity,
however, the Supreme Court has undertaken a balancing of interests.
Even when the government has precisely identified the scope of the
proposed search and the government interest claimed to justify the
search or seizure, courts must determine whether the intrusion into
personal privacy caused by the search is reasonable in light of the as-
serted government need. 60 To be sure, the Court has never explicitly
held that a legitimate state interest was not sufficiently important to
justify a search that otherwise met Fourth Amendment standards. Yet,
unless courts are prepared to insist that government searches and
seizures be justified by weighty government interests, constitutional
protection for an individual's privacy will be seriously diluted and
questionable government intrusions will be permitted as a matter of
protection and the intrusiveness of the search is most apparent in the Court's decisions
involving searches aimed at preventing the entry of illegal aliens into the United States.
Compare United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 895-98 (1975) (search of trunk and chassis of
automobiles at checkpoints must be based on probable cause) with United States v.
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 557-60 (1976) (request at permanent checkpoints for
documentation of passengers' nationality may proceed on less than reasonable suspicion
because of minimal invasion of privacy).
66. This notion that the reasonableness clause provides an additional standard of
protection, aside from the particularity and objectivity requirements of the warrant
clause, finds support in the history of the drafting of the Fourth Amendment. See N.
LASSON, supra note 61, at 102-03. One commentator has suggested that the warrant clause,
rather than encapsulating all components of the "reasonableness" standard, represents a
specific response to the abuse of general warrants. T. TAYLOR, Two STUDIES IN CONSTITU-
TIONAL INTERPRETATION 23-44, 64-71 (1969). According to this view, even a search to seize
specifically designated papers for purposes of criminal law enforcement may result in a
review of highly private testimonial material that runs afoul of the reasonableness standard
of the amendment's first clause. Id. at 67-68; see Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 98 S. Ct. 1970,
1978-79 (1978) (dictum) ("This is not to question that 'reasonableness' is the overriding
test of compliance with the Fourth Amendment or to assert that searches, however or
whenever executed, may never be unreasonable if supported by a warrant issued on
probable cause and properly identifying the place to be searched and the property to
be seized.")
The Court's opinion in Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 766-72 (1966) (forced
withdrawal of individual's blood for use as evidence in intoxication charge), indicates that
a reasonableness standard will still be applied to searches meeting the requirements of the
warrant clause. The Court acknowledged that the extraction occurred incident to a lawful
arrest and that the officers had adequate grounds to suspect the individual was in-
toxicated. Id. at 769-71. The Court, however, found it necessary to analyze the "reason-
ableness" of the blood test. Because such blood tests were routine procedures involving
no risk of trauma and pain and because the test in question had been performed at a
hospital by trained personnel, the Court held it to be a "reasonable" search. Id. at 771-72.
Thus the Court implied that a similar test made by untrained police officials at the scene
of the arrest, regardless of probable cause, might be unreasonable. Id.; see Rochin v.
California, 342 U.S. 165, 166, 172-74 (1952) (forced stomach pumping of individual who
police saw swallowing morphine violates due process clause). The Court has since implied
that the search in Rochin might be one example of the type of search considered un-
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. See United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 808
n.9 (1974). For a recent example of the application of the reasonableness standard by a
lower court, see Division 241, Amalgamated Transit Union v. Suscy, 538 F.2d 1264, 1267
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1029 (1976).
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course. 7 Thus a court faced with a government demand for authority
to search highly private material for what appear to be insufficient
reasons should adopt the following approach: when less intrusive means
exist to achieve the government's purpose, the court should minimize
the government intrusion by requiring that such means be adopted.
67. For example, consider the following hypothetical. Congress has passed the "Wel-
fare Assistance Reform Act" directing HEW to collect information for use in revising the
existing welfare system to cut federal spending. The Act states that such investigations
shall be limited to factors pertinent to welfare spending and shall not be conducted in a
manner that violates the civil rights of the subjects of the study. The Act, however, ex-
plicitly provides that HEW will have available all information gathering techniques used
by federal law enforcement personnel. HEW decides that welfare funding can be re-
structured and spending reduced only by analyzing the family structure of welfare
recipients, particularly patterns of family authority, husband-wife relationships, and child-
rearing techniques. HEW believes that this can only be accomplished by studying the
family in the context of the home; moreover, prior knowledge of the study by the family
will produce unnatural behavior and skew the results of the survey. Consequently, HEW
appears before a federal district court seeking a warrant to install electronic surveillance
devices in the homes of selected welfare recipients. In accordance with Title III of the
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) (1976), the
devices are to be used only to intercept conversations directly related to family life and
are to be activated only during those hours when the family is most likely to interact,
which HEW has determined to be dinner and breakfast. See Scott v. United States, 98
S. Ct. 1717, 1723-25 (1978) (minimization requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) (1976) rest
on determination of "reasonableness" of agents' conduct; circumstances may not permit
absolute determination of relevancy prior to interception).
Such a search might well satisfy the particularity and objectivity requirements of the
Fourth Amendment. The scope of the search is limited and particularly described and
the showing of government need would rest on objective and articulable factual cir-
cumstances. See notes 61 & 62 sutbra. Yet the court reviewing the HEW request would be
forced to assess the government need for the search against the resulting invasion of
privacy of the welfare recipients. Unless Fourth Amendment protection for personal privacy
is to lose all meaning, the court must first require HEW to formulate less intrusive means
of obtaining the desired information, thereby protecting the welfare recipients' privacy. If
this is not possible, the court should forbid the search. Cf. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (Douglas, J.) ("Would we allow the police to search the sacred
precincts of marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of contraceptives? The very idea
is repulsive to the notions of privacy surrounding the marriage relationship.")
The Court's holding in Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971), should not be viewed as
establishing precedent to the contrary. Although Wyman allowed the caseworker into the
recipient's home, the Court clearly stated that any subsequent search was extremely
limited, and that "snooping in the home" was forbidden. Id. at 321. Moreover, the
recipient always had the option not to permit entry. Id. at 317, 320-21. The search in the
hypothetical is much more extensive than that permitted in Wyman; in addition, the
recipient is not given the opportunity to prevent the search.
Nor should the Court's recent opinion in Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 98 S. Ct. 1970
(1978), be construed as establishing the absolute incompatability of a less-intrusive-means
approach with Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Zurcher can be distinguished from the
above hypothetical on the grounds that the case involved a search in furtherance of the
"State's interest in enforcing the criminal law." Id. at 1979. The Court seemed particularly
concerned that any attempt to protect the claimant's interests by requiring the use of a
subpoena rather than search warrant would involve serious "hazards to criminal investiga-
tion." Id. The central argument of this Note is that when individuals are subject to
searches or seizures for purposes other than criminal law enforcement, Fourth Amend-
ment interests may require a less intrusive alternative.
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But when this approach is not available, the court should protect in-
dividual privacy by forbidding the proposed search.
Where a proposed search and seizure is premised on a multitude of
government interests, and the material to be searched reflects varying
privacy concerns, this balancing approach requires a gradation of com-
peting interests. 68 In the case of Nixon's presidential material, certain
private material may be exempt from search or seizure unless there is a
particularized and objective showing that an important government
interest is at stake; public material may be vulnerable to seizure for
more generalized government purposes.
C. Weighing Privacy Interests in Presidential Material
1. Private Material
The acceptance of a privacy interest in diaries, family communica-
tions, and other private material stems from the private nature of the
circumstances surrounding the production and maintenance of the
material.69 Such material is generated out of relationships that have
traditionally been recognized by society as conferring a high degree of
privacy and that have been protected from other forms of government
interference. 0 Aside from constitutional limitations on government
activity directly affecting these private relationships, the existence of
invasion-of-privacy tort actions demonstrates the desire of society to
discourage the exposure of an individual's private affairs! 1 In view of
this longstanding social interest in preventing the control or dis-
closure of an individual's private relationships, an individual's ex-
pectation of privacy in such material takes on special significance.
2
68. At least one Justice has suggested that the protection afforded by the Fourth
Amendment should reflect the severity of the crime in question, thereby requiring the
gradation of law enforcement interests. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 183
(1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting); cf. Barrett, Personal Rights, Property Rights and the
Fourth Amendment, 1960 Sup. CT. REV. 46, 63 (reasonableness of police techniques should
be determined by seriousness of suspected crime).
69. See pp. 1606-08 suPra.
70. See, e.g., Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977) (family relation-
ships); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (marital relationship); Pierce
v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (parent-child relationship); Henkin, Privacy
and Autonomy, 74 COLUf. L. REv. 1410, 1424-29 (1974) (Court's right of privacy cases
recognize zone of "prima facie autonomy" involving, inter alia, marriage and family
relations).
71. See Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REv. 383, 389-98, 407 (1960) (tort of invasion of
privacy said to include intrusions into private activity and disclosure of private facts about
individual); Warren & Brandeis, supra note 27, at 205-07 (tort of invasion of privacy
founded on "general right to the immunity of the person,-the right to one's personality").
72. Thus, the Court in Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425 (1977).
recognized the validity of Nixon's expectation of privacy in communications arising out
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2. Public Material
Public material was created and stored under the reasonable ex-
pectation that the President would control its disposition and exposure.
Such material therefore falls within the scope of Fourth Amendment
protection. A lessened degree of Fourth Amendment protection, how-
ever, is appropriate for material produced by the President in a public
role. In part, the rationale for limiting protection for public material
is that the President voluntarily assumed a role in which his activity
would predictably be subject to extensive publicity and exposure."3
But even when the President may have had a reasonable belief that
certain material produced in a public capacity would be afforded a
high degree of confidentiality because of its sensitive nature, these
expectations do not deserve greater Fourth Amendment protection.
Constitutional protection for such material does not rest on the need
to protect personal privacy, but on the need to protect important
government operations or the institutional independence of the
Presidency. Protection for this type of material is derived from other
constitutional sources, such as the doctrine of executive privilege.
74
3. Defining Government Interests in Presidential Material
The Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act serves
a number of government interests pertaining to the control and
preservation of presidential material. Such interests differ in the ex-
tent to which they encompass important government needs and are
amenable to a specific and objective application.
of private relationships. See p. 1612 supra; cf. ALI MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT
PROCEDURE SS 210.3 (1975) ("writings or recordings, made solely for private use or com-
munication to an individual occupying a family, personal or other confidential rela-
tion" should be immune from seizure unless such things have served "a substantial purpose
in furtherance of a criminal enterprise"); Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 477-81 (1968)
(fundamental relationships involving love, trust, and friendship can only exist in context of
privacy); Note, Papers, Privacy and the Fourth and Fifth Amendments: A Constitutional
Analysis, 69 Nw. L. Rtv. 626, 631-36, 648-50 (1974) (suggesting Fourth Amendment privacy
values require courts to take into account private nature of material subject to seizure).
Diaries and other intrapersonal material also implicate First Amendment values. See
pp. 1609-10 supra. Where First and Fourth Amendment interests converge, protection of
privacy is greatest. Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 484-85 (1965).
73. Cf. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344 (1974) (public officials accept
risk of loss of privacy resulting from examination of public activity).
74. By its very nature this material would be generated during the performance of
government duties and would be suitable for retention and eventual public access. See
note 29 supra (discussing executive privilege claim); cf. Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn,
420 U.S. 469, 491-93 (1975) (material in public records stemming from judicial proceedings
is of legitimate public concern).
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a. Retention For Particular Uses
i. Immediate Use
The Act contemplates that presidential material may be seized and
retained in order to obtain access to specific material to satisfy an ob-
jective informational need. Such use of presidential material might
arise out of judicial proceedings in which the need for particular
documents or tapes has been established 75 or "executive reference," a
request from an executive department to examine material needed for
ongoing governmental purposes.70 In such a setting, the party re-
questing access to the material would have used available sources to
gain a clear idea of what documents contained the desired informa-
tion.77
In situations involving immediate use of the material for such
purposes, the First and Fourth Amendments would not prevent the
search and seizure of both public and private material likely to con-
tain the desired information. The scope of the search needed to satisfy
this type of public interest can be limited to prevent an examination of
material irrelevant to the stated objective, and the request for the
search would rest on an objective and reviewable showing of need.
Once these requirements are satisfied, the reasonableness of the
search and seizure must be addressed. The Court has held that, for
purposes of the First and Fourth Amendments, the protected or private
75. For a description of regulations allowing for access to the Nixon material for
private judicial proceedings, see note 14 supra. Nixon's presidential material has been
subpoenaed in at least ten criminal or civil proceedings unrelated to Watergate. Brief of
Appellees The Reporters Comm. For Freedom of the Press at 9 & n.7, Nixon v. Ad-
ministrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Brief of Appellees
Reporters Comm.].
76. One of the more recent requests for executive reference involved the Nixon-Thieu
correspondence concerning the extent of United States' commitment to South Vietnam.
Id. at 6. For a more complete review of past instances of executive reference, see Nixon v.
Administrator of Gen. Servs., 408 F. Supp. 321, 351 & n.41, 352 & n.42 (D.D.C. 1976), aff'd,
433 U.S. 425 (1977).
77. For example, the original regulations allowed the Watergate Special Prosecutor to
gain access to the materials only by "specifying those materials that he [had] reason to
believe [were] relevant to specified criminal investigations . . . and explaining why
access ... [was] important to a full and fair resolution of [the Watergate] investigations."
41 C.F.R. § 105-63.302-1. When the Special Prosecutor indicated that he had no further
interest in the Nixon presidential material, this provision was deleted. 42 Fed. Reg.
40,859-60 (1977). Presumably, a similar showing would have to be made by a private
litigant or government agency to withstand Nixon's constitutional challenge to requests
for immediate access. Cf. See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 544-45 (1967) (dictum) (sub-
poenaed party has right to object to overbreadth and irrelevancy of subpoena). Such a
showing would also meet the Fourth Amendment standard of "scrupulous exactitude"
required when the seizure of material cloaked with First Amendment interests is at stake,
as in the case of material containing intrapersonal speech. Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476,
485 (1965).
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nature of documentary material does not preclude its examination or
seizure for use in judicial proceedings.-, Consequently, public and
private material could be used in criminal or civil proceedings provided
that traditional privileges were respected. In the case of executive
reference, there may be varying degrees of need. If executive reference
is directed at material unavailable elsewhere for the purpose of de-
termining foreign policy commitments or similar objectives, private
and public material should be subject to examination and retention.
As the objective underlying executive reference becomes less defined
and approaches an "official curiosity" standard, private material would
warrant more stringent protection.7 0
ii. Future Use
Because the Act sets no mandatory date for the return of seized
material, it permits presidential material to be preserved indefinitely
for future judicial proceedings or executive reference. The Court ap-
proved a similar purpose in upholding the constitutionality of the
recordkeeping scheme at issue in California Bankers Association v.
Shultz.80 Although future use of presidential material represents an
important interest, the problem lies in ensuring that the implementa-
tion of a preservation scheme meets First and Fourth Amendment
standards.
78. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 309-10 (1967) (rejection of "mere evidence rule"
to allow for seizure of material other than fruits or instrumentalities of crime or contra-
band for evidence in criminal proceedings). The Court has also held that seizure of private
papers does not necessarily violate the Fifth Amendments prohibition against self-
incrimination. Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 470-78 (1976). Previously, in Boyd v.
United States, 116 U.S. 616, 633-35 (1886), the Court had held that the forced production
of pri'ate papers violated the Fifth Amendment and in doing so amounted to a per se
tureasonable search under the Fourth Amendment. Id. Because Nixon received a pardon
for all criminal acts committed while in office, 10 WEEKLY COtP. oF PRES. Doc. 1102-03
(Sept. 16, 1974), a Fifth Amendment claim regarding the use of presidential material
would only arise with respect to incriminating activity following his resignation. An
examination of Nixon's Fifth Amendment rights in such a situation is beyond the scope
of this Note.
First Amendment interests in private material embodying intrapersonal speech would
not prevent its seizure or use in criminal proceedings. See Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 98
S. Ct. 1970, 1982 (1978) ("presumptively protected materials [under First Amendment] are
not necessarily immune from seizure [as evidence] under warrant for use at a criminal
trial"). Presumably, this would also be true where use of the material for executive
reference or civil proceedings represented the same magnitude of government interest.
79. The language of § 102(d) of the Act providing for executive reference was specifi-
cally construed by the district court to prevent the "wholesale access [to presidential
material] by an) executive official for any conceivable executive purpose." Nixon v.
Administrator of Gen. Servs., 408 F. Supp. 321, 338 n.18 (D.D.C. 1976), afj'd, 433 U.S. 425
(1977). The Supreme Court accepted that position. 433 U.S. at 451 n.13.
80. 416 U.S. 21, 34 (1974) (government access to records maintained by banks under
Bank Secrecy Act of 1970 governed by legal process).
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In Shultz the Court did not subject the recordkeeping scheme to
Fourth Amendment standards, primarily because of its finding that
"mere maintenance of the records by banks," with the records only
available to the government through legal process, did not amount to
a search or seizure, and it rejected the plaintiff's First Amendment
claims."' When direct government acquisition and preservation of
presidential material are at issue, however, Shultz should not apply;
under these circumstances, government possession and control of the
desired material amount to a seizure. Normally, when the government
requests information for some future purpose, Fourth Amendment
standards require that the request be "sufficiently described and
limited in nature" and based upon a "tenable congressional determina-
tion" that the material will in fact prove to be of future use.8 2 In the
case of presidential material, successive administrations have primarily
sought to gain access to information, not recorded elsewhere, relating
to the conduct of foreign affairs by the President.8 3 Yet Congress could
reasonably anticipate that presidential material would be needed for
other future uses, such as criminal, civil, or legislative proceedings.8 4
The problem with attempting to assert control over presidential ma-
terial for these latter purposes is that it may be difficult or impossible
to describe particularly the material sought or to demonstrate objec-
tively the extent of government need. One possible solution would be
to employ a preservation scheme that involved the impoundment of
designated material without further examination until a predicted use
actually arose. The invasion of privacy of such a scheme would be
81. Id. at 53-54. It should be noted that the nexus between the required records and
the asserted government need was examined by the Court while reviewing plaintiff-banks'
due process claim. Id. at 46-49, 49 n.21. The Court found that Congress had made the
necessary showing that certain bank records had been useful in criminal proceedings and
would continue to be of value in the future. Id. The Court has since held that depositors
have no Fourth Amendment interest in bank records maintained under the Bank Secrecy
Act and cannot challenge subpoenas directed at such material. United States v. Miller, 425
U.S. 435, 440-45 (1976).
The Shultz Court also rejected a First Amendment challenge to the recordkeeping
requirements on the grounds that an associational privacy claim required the "actual dis-
closure of records" and a "concrete fact situation in which competing associational and
governmental interests" could be weighed. 416 U.S. at 56. Although the seizure and re-
tention of presidential material would not appear to implicate associational privacy claims,
see p. 1610 supra, this would not be the case with private material containing intra-
personal speech, see pp. 1609-10 supra. Seizure and retention of this protected material
would have to be in furtherance of compelling government objectives.
82. 416 U.S. at 63, 67.
83. Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 408 F. Supp. 321, 351 n.4I (D.D.C. 1976),
affl'd, 433 U.S. 425 (1977) (district court acknowledged that "the preponderance of requests
have related to foreign affairs").
84. The record in Nixon v. Administrator of General Services did indicate that
presidential material had been occasionally used for such purposes. Id.
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minimal provided that any subsequent use of the material was subject
to full First and Fourth Amendment protections.
Under such a preservation scheme, seizure of private and public
material would be constitutional as long as the provisions for future
access met First and Fourth Amendment standards.8 5 As part of the
overall reasonableness of the preservation scheme, however, time limits
on retention might have to be established contingent on the expected
duration of the government interest justifying the seizure.8 6
b. Retention for a General Disclosure Need
i. Preservation of Material Related to a Specific Event
The prime objective behind the Act was to preserve and disclose
material containing information about Watergate. Because the activity
falling under that designation can be defined with some degree of
specificity, 7 the search and seizure of material falling within the def-
inition would not necessarily offend the particularity requirement of
the Fourth Amendment.8  In addition, an objective review of the
85. The provisions of § 102(b), (d) of the Act accomplish this by allowing Nixon to
assert any defense, privilege, or right to prevent immediate access to the material.
Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act of 1974, § 102(b), (d), 44 U.S.C.
§ 2107 (Supp. V 1975); see note 14 supra. As long as these provisions remained in effect
for the duration of the preservation scheme, see note 86 infra, private and public material
could be retained.
The preservation of private material containing intrapersonal speech for executive
reference or use in judicial proceedings, while requiring some review of the material by
archivists, see note 44 supra, would not appear to impermissibly infringe First Amendment
interests provided that the duration of the preservation scheme was limited and strict
Fourth Amendment standards governed access.
86. For example, if material is preserved for use in criminal proceedings relating to
noncapital offenses, the preservation period would be coterminous with the five year
statute of limitations provided by 18 U.S.C. § 3282 (1976). In the case of the Nixon
presidential material, August 8, 1979, marks the date when the statute will have run
with regard to noncapital offenses committed by individuals during the Nixon Presi-
dency. Cf. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 593 (1977) (statute required destruction of state-
collected medical prescription records after five-year storage period).
87. The regulations define "Watergate" as including those acts allegedly "conducted,
directed, or approved by Richard M. Nixon, his staff or persons associated with him
in his constitutional, statutory or political functions as President" that fall within the
charters of the Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities and Water-
gate Special Prosecution Force or are described in the Articles of Impeachment adopted by
the House Committee on the Judiciary. 42 Fed. Reg. 63,626 (1977) (to be codified in 41
C.F.R. § 105-63.104(c)).
88. The main characteristic of such a search would be its breadth; any document
might contain the desired information. But a broad search pursuant to specific standards
is not a general warrant. See Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 480 & n.l0, 481-82 (1976)
(warrant covering broad range of documents and "other fruits, instrumentalities and
evidence of crime at this [time] unknown" held not to violate prohibition of general
warrants because officials conducting search understood that its language referred to
specific crime under investigation).
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search or seizure would be possible; a court could determine the rele-
vance of the seized material to the events of Watergate.
Fourth Amendment protection does not end at this point, for the
final determination of reasonableness would still require a balancing
of the intrusion on personal security and the government need for the
material. Preservation of private material because its informational
content related to an event Congress has held to be of national interest
would subject interchanges of the most intimate nature to examination
and seizure.
The reasonableness requirement would not prevent the seizure of
private material. Implicit in the requirement of reasonableness, how-
ever, is the consideration of less intrusive means to fulfill the govern-
ment need.80 An initial restriction of the search or seizure to public
material would prevent an unnecessarily broad and intrusive search
of private material. For example, the government could discover that
a review of public material has produced the desired information; in
such a case the government might disclaim any further interest in
private material. If public material did not contain enough informa-
tion to present an accurate account of an unexplained event of signif-
icant public interest, the government would then have to establish
that private material was reasonably likely to provide the missing in-
formation. Such a showing might be based on references to potentially
valuable private information discovered during the review of public
correspondence, tapes, or memoranda. In effect the government
would have to make an objective showing that would permit a review-
ing court to substantiate the claim for access to private material.00
89. While this type of review has been traditionally applied in a First Amendment
context, one judge has recommended that to determine the reasonableness of govern-
ment intrusions under a Fourth Amendment standard, such a balancing test is highly
appropriate. Hufstedler, The Directions and Misdirections of a Constitutional Right of
Privacy, 26 A.B.A. RECORD 546, 562 (1971); cf. LaFave, Administrative Searches and the
Fourth Amendment: The Camara and See Cases, 1967 Sup. CT. REV. 1, 14-15 (courts
must decide when implementation of government interests through searches or seizures
reaches acceptable results). The Court in Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs. considered
a less-restrictive-means test to determine the reasonableness of the original seizure but
concluded that the commingling of private and public documents, together with the need
for uniform processing standards, required the more intrusive comprehensive screening.
433 U.S. at 463-64 & n.25; cf. note 67 supra (discussing Court's refusal to enforce least in-
trusive means in context of criminal law enforcement).
In any case, where the retention of private material involves intrapersonal speech, First
Amendment standards would require the type of less restrictive approach outlined above.
90. This might be the case in a situation similar to the seizure of Oswald's private
diaries and papers under the Kennedy Assassination Act. See note 6 supra. The assassina-
tion of President Kennedy was an event of recognizable national significance; moreover,
the paucity of information surrounding the assassination highlighted the value of any
information in Oswald's possession. An additional factor to be considered in judging
the reasonableness of the seizure is whether government access to the material has
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Until it was determined that public material was not an adequate
source of information, private material could be preserved and shielded
from access.
ii. Preservation of Historically Significant Material
Although the impetus for and specific focus of the Act is the need
for disclosure of Watergate information, the Act also provides for the
preservation of material of historical worth. Rather than specifying
significant events other than Watergate, Congress has entrusted that
judgment to trained archivists who have experience with historical uses
of presidential material. This approach clashes with the particularity
and objectivity requirements of the Fourth Amendment. The scope of
a search for historical material could hardly be limited to exclude
irrelevant matters. Given the unique level of interest in presidential
activities, a directive to archivists that they search and seize material of
historical significance would require a search of all presidential
material.01
Even if Congress had excluded certain broad categories of material
from such a search, the seizure and retention of the remaining ma-
terial would still have to rest on an objective showing of need amenable
to judicial review. 2 This requirement is intended to restrict the ex-
already taken place before preservation. Oswald's material had been first seized as evi-
dence of a criminal act immediately following the assassination. Plaintiff's Brief, supra
note 39, at 192 n.80. Following the seizure of material for criminal law enforcement
purposes, nothing prevents the content of the material from being "preserved" during
trial as it is entered into the record. Cf. Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 492,
495-97 (1975) (press protected from privacy claim resulting from accurate publication of
name of rape victim contained in public records and open to public inspection). In such
a case, the individual's expectation of privacy in the information may no longer be
reasonable. See p. 1611 supra; cf. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 712-13 (1976) (plaintiff had
no Fourteenth Amendment "right of privacy" regarding publication of record of official
arrest).
91. The three-judge district court in Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs. conceded as
much: "Virtually any item might be needed by a historian, depending upon what sub-
jects seem fit to study some years from now." 408 F. Supp. 321, 355 (D.D.C. 1976), aff'd, 433
U.S. 425 (1977). In fact, because a good deal of presidential material is duplicated else-
where, the most sought-after and historically interesting material may be the most
private or intimate, e.g., personal medical history, individual reflections, or husband-wife
conversations.
The particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment was deliberately constructed
to reduce official discretion during a search and seizure and to prevent general searches.
See note 61 supra. As indicated by the Court in Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967),
the Fourth Amendment demands specificity as to the material to be seized and as to
the purpose of the seizure. Allowing official wiretapping to discover evidence of criminal
activity without identifying what specific crime has been or is being committed amounted
to a "roving commission to 'seize' any and all conversations." rd. at 59. Permitting
archivists to search and seize private and public material under a historical significance
standard would produce the same impermissible result.
92. See note 62 supra.
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ercise of official discretion when Fourth Amendment privacy interests
are at stake. A standard of historical significance may permit a profes-
sional historian to seize material based on no more than a subjective
determination that it gives a better "feel" for the era or provides
greater "insights" into the activity of the President. Such a determina-
tion is quite different from the type of probable cause analysis used in
a criminal law enforcement setting.93
When a search in furtherance of a legitimate government interest
cannot be structured to satisfy the traditional particularity and ob-
jectivity standards of the Fourth Amendment, personal privacy interests
may be accommodated by other means.94 The search in question can
be altered to minimize the intrusion on Nixon's privacy interests in
satisfaction of the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness standard and to
protect First Amendment interests in intrapersonal speech.
To allow the examination and retention of private material for its
historical significance would unnecessarily intrude on personal privacy.
Such governmental searches and seizures would be based on nothing
more than public curiosity about the private activity of the President,
and the resulting information would be of marginal social value.05
93. In a criminal law context, probable cause requires a showing that the items to
be seized were either "'used in the commission of, or constitute evidence of,'" an of.
fense and are to be found at the place searched. LaFave, Search And Seizures: "The
Course Of True Law Has Not . . . Run Smooth", 1966 U. ILL. L.F. 255, 257.62 (quoting
Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 38, § 108-3 (1965)). The crux of such a showing of "probative lia-
bility" is that the offense has been defined by the legislature to include identifiable
factual components; the magistrate or police official is able to match the facts before
him with the prescribed conduct as outlined by the legislature. The legislative mandate
in the case of a standard of historical significance is so vague that it permits official
seizure of material based on unreviewable judgments as to probable historical worth,
even if such material was not originally covered under the legislative directive. For a
discussion of a similar Fourth Amendment problem in the area of vagrancy and loitering
laws, see Note, Orders to Move On and the Prevention of Crime, 87 YALE L.J. 603, 607-10
(1978).
When First Amendment values are at stake, as in the case of private material containing
intrapersonal speech, the Court has held that a search and seizure must not rest on "the
whim of the officers" charged with its execution. Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 485
(1965).
94. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1967). In Terry, the Court made it clear that
notions of Fourth Amendment protection in one context (searches incident to arrest)
need not be transported to situations involving other types of government interests (pro-
tective frisks). Id. at 25-27. The Court took pains, however, to ensure that the protective
frisk approved was limited in scope and based on some objective showing of need. Id.
at 18-22; cf. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 538-39 (1967) (probable cause need
not depend "upon specific knowledge of the condition of the particular dwelling";
warrant could be issued on basis of general standards to ensure Fourth Amendment
protection).
95. The Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act has been viewed as
an attempt to provide the nation's citizens with information to help them "evaluate
and perhaps to shape the present and future": the "promotion of such understanding
could hardly be more integral to a society based on democratic principles and devoted
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The public's desire to be informed about the conduct of the Presidency
could be satisfied as long as public presidential material was available
for study by future generations. Public material would relate to
activities of recognizable historical importance and legitimate public
interest. Moreover, because this category of material has been made
available to historians and has proved to be of historical value, the
subjectivity of the archival judgment would not be as great as in cases
dealing with private material. Consequently, the reasonableness balance
would allow for the implementation of a historical significance stan-
dard for public material, while exempting private material from such
an archival determination. 96
to freedom of expression ...." Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 408 F. Supp. 321,
349-50 (D.D.C. 1976), aff'd, 433 U.S. 425 (1977). Although the Court has recognized that one
goal of the First Amendment is "producing an informed public capable of conducting its
own affairs," Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 392 (1969), it has also
indicated that information relating to an individual's private activities plays a minor role
in furthering First Amendment values and that the individual therefore deserves in-
creased protection. See note 26 supra. In effect, the public's "right to know" about the
President can be distinguished and accorded less weight than its "right to know" about
the conduct of the Presidency. Bloustein, The First Amendment and Privacy: The Su-
preme Court Justice and the Philosopher, 28 RUTGERs L. Rav. 41, 94-95 (1974) (some
aspects of individual's life bear no logical relationship to right of democratic people to
be informed; curiosity in such material not sufficient grounds for First Amendment
protection).
When private material encompasses intrapersonal speech, retention solely for the sake
of widespread exposure to the public would appear to violate First Amendment privacy
rights. Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 200 (1957).
96. In his concurrence in Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., Justice White
stated that "the validity of the Act would be questionable if mere historical significance
sufficed to withhold purely private letters or diaries," 433 U.S. at 487-88, and added
that he "would question whether a mere historical interest in purely private communi-
cations would be a sufficient predicate for taking them for public use." Id. at 490. Justice
White refused, however, to address the question directly because of appellees' concession
at oral argument that Nixon's "dictabelt diaries" and "personal letters, among his family
or friends" would be returned "regardless of their historical significance." Id. at 489
n*. The majority opinion recognized this concession and indicated that the Government
"should now promptly disclaim any interest in materials conceded to be appellant's
[Nixon's] purely private communications and deliver them to him." Id. at 459 n.22
(emphasis added).
The scope and effect of this concession by appellees is unclear. By voluntarily re-
moving material from the coverage of the Act and the legislatively mandated retention
criteria of § 104(a)(7), the appellees effectively reconstrued the Act and their construction
was adopted implicitly by the Court. 433 U.S. at 459 n.22. Assuming that their concession
is binding during implementation of the Act, the crucial question is what material falls
within the concession. The majority opinion of the Court limited the concession to items
referred to by the appellees, e.g., "dictabelt tapes," "personal letters, among his [Nixon's]
family or friends." Id. at 489 n.*. A wide variety of private material, including inter-
changes recorded on the White House tapes, business records, or material generated
out of common law privileges, falls outside the concession and would be subject to re-
tention based on "historical significance." In his concurring opinion, Justice White
seemed to interpret the concession more broadly, holding it to apply to "'personal
property of any kind not involving the actual transaction of government business.'" Id. at
487.
This Note argues that all private material is constitutionally protected, regardless of
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c. Retention Based on Superior Property Rights
Finally, the Act has been viewed as establishing control over govern-
ment property. Although the property interest in Nixon's presidential
materials has never been formally determined,97 the definition of
government property in cases involving other high government of-
ficials98 would restrict such a proprietary claim to material produced
during the performance of presidential duties. All private material
would be excluded, except for some intrapersonal documents or
recordings. The scope of search and seizure necessary to implement the
standard would be limited to a particular type of material qualifying
as government property and the determinations of the individuals
performing the search would be based on objective criteria that could
be reviewed by a third party.99
The reasonableness of such a seizure would still involve a balancing
of government property interests against Nixon's privacy interests.
Most material qualifying as government property would be generated
by the President and his aides in their public capacity. Because this
material presents weaker privacy claims, its seizure as government
property would not appear unreasonable: by definition it resulted from
the use of government materials and personnel during the performance
of high level government activity.10 Seizure of intrapersonal material
the concessions of the appellees. If the Act, as construed by the parties to the case
and by the Court, now excludes dictabelt diaries and personal letters, then the failure
of the regulations implementing the Act to exempt specifically this material from re-
tention, see note 103 infra, violates the Court's construction of the Act as well as
Nixon's constitutional rights.
97. See note 6 supra.
98. See note 100 infra.
99. This type of search would be similar to the routine automobile inventory search
held not to violate the Fourth Amendment in South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364
(1976). Such searches involve "securing and inventorying" the contents of automobiles
impounded by the police for parking violations or other traffic violations. Id. at 369.
Private material would be retrieved in accordance with standard procedures and officials
performing the search would have little leeway to make discretionary determinations of
the sort found in a search for historically significant material. Id. at 383-84 (Powell, J.,
concurring). In light of the views of a majority of the Justices in South Dakota v.
Opperman, private material would have to be identified in the least intrusive manner.
Id. at 380 n.7 (Powell, J., concurring), 387 n.4 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (plain view
articles to be inventoried without further intrusion into closed areas or packages).
100. The government ownership test as applied in cases involving lower officials
requires that the content of the material relate to an individual's government duties
and that the context of production reflect the use of government personnel or materials.
See United States v. First Trust Co., 251 F.2d 686, 690 (8th Cir. 1958) (certain notes
prepared by Captain William Clark while on Lewis and Clark expedition not government
property because contents related to "personal illnesses, social engagements, and other
such items" not expected to be found in notes of official character); Public Affairs Assocs.
v. Rickover, 268 F. Supp. 444, 448-49 (D.D.C. 1967) (speeches delivered by Admiral Hyman
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on the basis of proprietary interests raises more serious problems.
Nixon's expectations of privacy concerning this material are significant;
moreover established case law makes it clear that both the First and
Fourth Amendments require greater protection for such material.1 1
Finally, because proprietary claims arise from the use of government
funds and time to create the material, Nixon might accommodate such
an interest by compensating the government for the value of any in-
trapersonal material he retains. The strong privacy interests in intra-
personal material, combined with an alternative means of satisfying a
proprietary claim, would make the seizure and permanent retention
of such material unreasonable and therefore unconstitutional.
III. Application of the Constitutional Framework
to Regulations Implementing the Act
A. Permanent Retention
The regulations promulgated by the General Services Administra-
tion call for the permanent retention of material that Congress cannot
constitutionally retain. First, the regulations do not adequately dis-
tinguish public material from private material. Second, the regulations
provide for permanent retention of private material for purposes that
violate the First and Fourth Amendments.
1. Private Material
The regulations contain an exemption designed to protect private
material from retention. Material "relating solely to a person's family
or other non-public activities, and having no connection with his con-
stitutional or statutory duties or political activities as President" will
be returned.10 2 But the terms of this exemption fail to establish that
private material includes anything arising out of private activity,
rather than material whose content solely "relates" or is "connected"
Rickover not government publications because unrelated to official duties and prepared
at home during leisure time); cf. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press v. Vance,
442 F. Supp. 383, 387 (D.D.C. 1977), appeal docketed, No. 77-220 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 24, 1978)
(tapes of telephone conversations prepared by Secretary of State Kissinger with assistance
of government personnel and essential to conduct of official business held government
property).
101. Cf. United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 314, 317 (1972) (when
First Amendment interests at stake Fourth Amendment protection is strongest).
102. 42 Fed. Reg. 63,626 (1977) (to be codified in 41 C.F.R. § 105-63.104(b)) (defining
"private or personal" material); id. at 63,628 (to be codified in 41 C.F.R. § 105-63A01-5(a))
(providing for return of "private or personal" material).
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to nonpublic activities; the proposed categorization is simply too
narrow to provide adequate protection for private material. 03
Of course, before material can be retained permanently, it must be
found to be sufficiently related to Watergate or of sufficient historical
significance that retention is warranted. But, as indicated earlier, 0'
private material containing information related to Watergate could
only be retained after a showing that public material failed to provide
an adequate record. Retention of private material pursuant to a stan-
dard of historical significance'0 5 would also violate the reasonableness
test.
103. The regulations do represent an attempt to circumvent the retention criteria of
§ 104(a)(7) of the Act. Rather than subject all material seized under the Act to the
broad retention criteria of § 104(a)(7) (Watergate related or of general historical signifi-
cance), the regulations appear to implement a two-step process. Material relating to
"family" or "non-public" activities is to be identified and channeled directly to Nixon,
without any examination as to whether it is historically significant or Watergate-related.
42 Fed. Reg. 63,627 (1977) (to be codified in 41 C.F.R. § 105-63.401-2(a), .401-2(b)) (pro-
viding for segregation of material); id. at 63,628 (to be codified in 41 C.F.R. § 105-63.401-
5(a)) (providing for return of segregated material to Nixon).
While this approach would seem to incorporate the private-public distinction suggested
in this Note, see pp. 1606-08 supra, the protection that the regulations afford to private
material falls short of the proposed standard. The "relating solely" or "having no con-
nection with" criteria the regulations use to define private material are sufficiently
broad to allow retention of material generated out of private activity but containing
references to public behavior. This could include material arising out of private in-
terpersonal exchanges and intrapersonal material. Regardless of any constitutional in-
terest in such material, some items may be covered by the concessions of the appellees in
the case and required to be returned to Nixon without any archival review. See note
96 supra.
Nixon has already filed suit to test the constitutionality of the regulations relating
to immediate access and public access. See note 19 supra. As part of his complaint,
Nixon alleges that certain material relating to personal and political affairs cannot law-
fully be deemed "Presidential historical materials" and must be returned to his cus-
tody. Nixon's Amended Complaint, supra note 19, at 12-13. In light of the Fourth and
First Amendment interests inhering in intrapersonal and private material, Nixon's claim
seems well grounded, at least where certain government interests are involved. See pp.
1620-29 sutra.
104. See p. 1624 supra.
105. See pp. 1625-27 supra. The regulations define "general historical significance"
as "having administrative, legal, research or other historical value as evidence of or in-
formation about the constitutional or statutory duties or political activities of the Presi-
dent, which an archivist has determined is of quality sufficient to warrant the retention
by the United States of materials so designated." 42 Fed. Reg. 63,626 (1977) (to be codified
in 41 C.F.R. § 105-63.104(d)) (emphasis added). The GSA standards recognize the difficulty
of providing a concrete definition of "historical significance" and vest the archivists with
unlimited discretion in making the determination. GSA REPORT TO CoNIRrss, supra note 2,
at G-18. The explanations provided by GSA for its regulations justify this delegation of au-
thority: "In practice, archivists routinely apply this definition to determine which records
the General Services Administration will authorize for disposal, and, conversely, which
records must be retained." Id. In such circumstances, however, the material is not cloaked
with Fourth and First Amendment interests. A court reviewing the archivist's determination
of "historical significance" with respect to presidential material cloaked with a Fourth
and First Amendment interest is faced with the dilemma of deferring to the judgment
of a professional historian unfamiliar with the constitutional restrictions applicable to
his actions.
1630
Government Control of Presidential Material
As the regulations currently stand, even in cases in which the in-
formation fits the definition of "private or personal," if the document
or recording contains both private and official information, the orig-
inal will be retained, with Nixon receiving a copy of the private in-
formation. 10 This process ignores the crux of Nixon's First and Fourth
Amendment claims regarding private material; to permit any private
material to remain in government hands without an adequate justifica-
tion would be unconstitutional. Unless the government could legit-
imately claim that there was no possible way to excise private
material, private and public material would have to be separated, with
only the latter made available for public disclosure. 107
As indicated earlier, private material is not totally exempt from
retention: material that might be of use in judicial or legislative
proceedings, or needed for executive reference, could be subject to a
preservation scheme requiring only minimal processing and permitting
access upon a showing of particularized need. 08 The regulations fail to
adopt such an approach; private and public material will be im-
mediately processed for public access. Material failing to meet reten-
tion standards will be returned to Nixon. 09
2. Public Material
The regulations are clearly designed to retain material generated
during Nixon's performance of his presidential duties."10 This material
presents the weakest Fourth Amendment claim and seizure of public
106. 42 Fed. Reg. 63,628 (1977) (to be codified in 41 C.F.R. § 105-63A01-5(c)). It also
appears that all original copies of all of Nixon's tapes will be retained. Id. at 63.629
(to be codified in 41 C.F.R. § 105-63A04(a)). Although the Act directs GSA to obtain
control of "all original tape recordings," Presidential Recordings and Materials Preserva-
tion Act of 1974 § 101(a), 44 U.S.C. § 2107 (Supp. V 1975), it does not specifically direct
GSA to retain the original tapes in order to fulfill the public access requirements of § 104.
Id. at § 104(a). The tapes contain recordings of private conversations between Nixon and
his family, physicians, clergy and attorney. Appellant's Brief, supra note 28, at 21-23. Be-
cause the White House taping system was voice activated it also recorded Nixon's personal
dictabelt dictations. Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 545 n.1 (1977)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Thus a wide range of personal material will be retained because
it is interspersed with official information.
107. Placing restrictions on access to personal material that is retained does not
render Nixon's Fourth Amendment claim groundless. Privacy interests in private material
could not be flaunted by placing access restrictions on such material, waiting until all
interested parties were dead, and then claiming there were no longer privacy interests
in the material. If Fourth Amendment protection is to remain meaningful, the asserted
government interest in the material must be balanced against privacy interests at the
time of seizure.
108. See pp. 1621-23 sutra.
109. 42 Fed. Reg. 63,628 (1977) (to be codified in 41 C.F.R. § 105-63A01-5(a)).
110. "Presidential historical materials" include any material "made or received" by
Nixon or his staff in connection with "his constitutional or statutory duties." 42 Fed.
Reg. 63,626 (1977) (to be codified in 41 C.F.R. § 105-63.104(a)).
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material based on superior property rights or a desire to preserve in-
formation about Watergate or historically significant activity would
not necessarily violate Fourth Amendment standards.'
The regulations also indicate that any material produced by the
President in his role as head of his party may be retained if related to
Watergate or of general historical significance.' 2 Political material of
this sort represents weaker Fourth Amendment interests because it was
created during activity of a public nature. Any First Amendment in-
terests in such material would not be implicated by retention; a valid
First Amendment claim could only arise in response to an attempt to
use or disclose the material representing associational activity. 13
B. Archival Screening
Neither the district court nor the Supreme Court directly addressed
the constitutionality of archival processing procedures." 4 Concern for
Nixon's First and Fourth Amendment interests, however, requires
that screening procedures be designed to minimize intrusions on
Nixon's privacy with regard to material that cannot constitutionally
be retained. 1 5 Commentary to the first set of regulations submitted
to Congress stated that each piece of material will be subject to
"virtually a word by word" review; each hour of tape will be subject
to an average of twenty hours of review to produce transcripts.'"
111. See pp. 1620-29 supra.
112. The definition of "Presidential historical materials" includes material made
or received by the President in connection with "political activities as President," 42 Fed.
Reg. 63,626 (to be codified in 41 C.F.R. § 105-63.104(a)); this is narrowed somewhat by
the definition of personal material which exempts from seizure material reflecting "non-
public activities." 42 Fed. Reg. 63,626 (1977) (to be codified in 41 C.F.R. § 105-63.104(a),
.104(b)). Therefore, political affiliations unrelated to the President's Republican Party
role or other public political activities may not be retained.
Material created by private organizations, such as the Committee to Re-Elect the
President, relating to the President's public political activity, is stored with the National
Archives. See note 2 supra. The GSA had previously indicated that this material was
excluded from the coverage of the Act. See id. The terms of the Act, in particular
§ 101(b)(l), are broad enough to cover this material, however, especially if the Act is
viewed as asserting control over the corpus of material originally covered by the Nixon-
Sampson Agreement. See note 10 supra.
113. See p. 1610 suPra.
114. The district court recommended certain procedures for minimizing the intrusion
into private or personal material. These included requiring the archivists to scan the
outer packaging of the material to determine its contents, using Nixon to aid in the
preliminary identification of material, giving Nixon a voice in the selection of archivists,
and providing Nixon with notice of all proposed classifications before they are effectuated.
Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 408 F. Supp. 321, 339-40 (D.D.C. 1976), aff'd, 433
U.S. 425 (1977). The public access regulations implement the last suggestion regarding
notice to Nixon. 42 Fed. Reg. 63,627 (1977) (to be codified in 41 C.F.R. § 105-63.401(c)).
115. The Court has made it clear that the scope of a search must be limited to at-
taining the objectives that justified its inception. See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40,
65 (1968).
116. GSA REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 2, at D-3, E-6. The preliminary archival
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These procedures may prove unnecessarily intrusive. Once the cate-
gories of material that cannot appropriately be retained pursuant to a
particular government purpose have been defined, only a cursory re-
view is necessary to identify such material and return it. Procedures
should be established to weed out material that is protected before an
exhaustive review takes place.1,7 This would be the case with private
material subject to a search to preserve public material for disclosure
to the public."18
processing standards issued by the National Archives and Records Service, see note 24
supra, partially minimize intrusions into private material. During the duplication of
tapes, archivists will listen to a private conversation "only as much as necessary to establish
its private nature and to determine its duration." National Archives and Records Service,
supra note 24, at 2. When segregation of presidential material takes place, however, archi-
vists "will accomplish page by page review" of textual material and a "systematic re-
view of tape recorded conversations." Id. at 4. The current regulations fail to indicate
just how intensive the archival review will be. 42 Fed. Reg. 63,626 (1977) (to be codified in
41 C.F.R. §§ 105-63.104(h), 63.401-2(a) to -2(c)) (as part of "initial archival processing"
archivists directed to reproduce and transcribe tape recordings and review material
for return to Nixon). As part of his attack on the constitutionality of the regulations,
see notes 19 9- 103 supra, Nixon contends that the absence of "standards or procedures
to minimize the intrusion" into private materials violates his First and Fourth Amend-
ment rights. Nixon's Amended Complaint, supra note 19, at 7 ff 16.
117. Private material could be identified by determining the status of the parties
involved in its creation and examining its contents to the extent necessary to determine
whether they were acting in a private capacity. Any search more intrusive than the one
outlined above would represent a needless invasion of Nixon's privacy. As the Court
has recognized, searches or seizures that are reasonable at their inception may become
unreasonable because of the manner in which they are carried out. See Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1, 19-20, 29-30 (1968).
118. One more aspect of the regulations may result in intrusive forays into private
material. The regulations require any archivist who discovers materials "which reflect
an apparent violation of law" during the initial processing period to report this to the
Administrator for referral to the Justice Department or other appropriate investigative
agency. 42 Fed. Reg. 63,627 (1977) (to be codified in 41 C.F.R. § 105-63.401-2(d)). Because
of his pardon, Nixon suffers no immediate jeopardy from such a requirement. Moreover,
other individuals who can be prosecuted for any illegal activity contained in the material,
such as his family or friends, probably lack Fourth Amendment standing to contest the
search. See Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 335-36, 336 n.19 (1973) (individual did not
have reasonable expectation of privacy in material controlled by third party). Imposing
an obligation on archivists to report criminal violations could expand the scope of the
search beyond that necessary to further the original objectives of the Act. Under the
type of search proposed earlier, archivists need only examine material until it becomes
apparent that it embodies private activity. See note 117 supra. Under the "plain view"
exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement, any incriminating material
discovered at this stage in the search could be used to establish criminal liability.
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 469-70 (1971) ("plain view doctrine" applies
only to inadvertent discoveries of incriminating material). Because the regulations do
not contain any provisions requiring minimally intrusive processing techniques, archivists
are free to continue to examine private material, after its private nature has been
established, for evidence of criminal activity. Such a search would amount to a planned
warrantless seizure of incriminating material. As the Court in Coolidge indicated, the
"plain view" exception was never intended to legitimize such deliberate seizures. Id.
at 471 & n.27. In such a case, the archivists would be performing a "general search"
of private material in violation of traditional Fourth Amendment standards. See note 61
supra. As indicated earlier, see note 19 supra, the Government has recently conceded
the unconstitutionality of this provision. The government concession, however, may be
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Conclusion
The Nixon case establishes that retroactive legislation directed at
the public material of a President does not necessarily violate Fourth
or First Amendment interests. Once the current custodians of public
material are identified," 9 retention would have to be accomplished
through a nonintrusive procedure, such as compulsory process, unless
exigent circumstances justified an actual search and seizure. Any at-
tempt to obtain control of private presidential material would only be
legitimate for the type of government interests and standards discussed
earlier. 12
0
Much attention has centered on the prospective regulation of presi-
dential material. Title II of the Presidential Recordings and Materials
Preservation Act established a National Commission to study the dis-
position of the official papers of federal officials, including the
President, Congressmen, and federal judges.12 A number of bills have
been introduced providing for government ownership of the work
unnecessarily broad. Incriminating material inadvertently appearing in "plain view"
during minimal processing could be used as criminal evidence without violating the
Fourth Amendment.
119. Correspondence with the six Presidential Libraries reveals a degree of uncertainty
concerning the number of private individuals currently possessing public presidential
material and the amount of material they have. The Assistant Director of the Johnson
Library stated that "White House aides have retained some of the records generated
by their offices"; the Director of the Eisenhower Library said that it was "probable"
members of the White House staff possess "official documents" from the Eisenhower
administration; Directors of the Kennedy, Truman and Roosevelt Libraries felt it was
unlikely presidential material from their respective administrations remained in private
hands; the Director of the Hoover Library merely indicated that the Hoover family
had donated all the official material in its possession to the Library (correspondence
on file with Yale Law Journal). President Ford has donated all of his public presidential
material to the government. 12 WEEKLY CoMPt'. OF PREs. Doe. 1709-19 (Dec. 20, 1976).
But it is not yet known whether White House staff of the Ford administration possess
public presidential material.
120. See pp. 1619-29 supra.
121. 44 U.S.C. §§ 3315-3324 (Supp. V 1975). The National Study Commission proposal
creates a category of "Public Papers," defined as "documentary materials that the Presi-
dent ... made or received in connection with the President's constitutional or statutory
duties." MAJORITY REPORT, supra note 48, at 29. The President would remain in control
of his "Public Papers" during his term of office, but such material could not be
destroyed without the approval of the Archivist of the United States. Id. The Majority
Report, however, proposes no sanctions if material is destroyed without the approval
of the Archivist. Conceivably, willful destruction of presidential material could fall under
the general prohibition against destruction of public records. See 18 U.S.C. § 2071 (1976).
"Public Papers" would be donated at the end of the President's administration, with
access restrictions ranging from 10-15 years. Majority Report, supra note 48 at 30. Under
the Commission's proposal, records pertaining to the President's "personal participation
in party politics," family affairs, or papers created for "his own use rather than in con-
nection with his Presidential duties" are considered to be his personal property. Id. at
31-32. In terms of the analysis presented in this Note, the Commission's proposal gives too
much protection to public political activity and ignores privacy interests in all intraper-
sonal material.
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product of elected officials. 122 These proposals reflect growing interest
in establishing public ownership rights in material prepared on the
job and relating to official duties.
By making clear that official material would be retained by the
government, these proposals would avoid the more serious Fourth
Amendment problems created by the seizure of the Nixon papers.
Once prior notice of a superior property interest is established, any ex-
pectation of privacy arising from temporary possessory rights is un-
reasonable. But the problem of constitutional protection for a Presi-
dent's intrapersonal material prepared as part of his official activity
would remain.
123
In theory, the President may have an option not to create intra-
personal material during the conduct of the Presidency. But practically,
the decision whether or not to create intrapersonal material amounts
to a Hobson's choice. The nature of the job demands that the President
document ideas, attitudes, and opinions on the multitude of social and
political issues confronting him as he governs. Even in the case of
prospective retention, intrapersonal material should be exempt from
seizures based on proprietary rights or a desire to preserve and expose
the material to the public.
122. One of the most recent proposals for government ownership of official presidential
material is H.R. 11001, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978). H.R. 11001 defines "Presidential
records" as anything made or received by the President or his staff that does not con-
stitute "personal papers" and is appropriate for retention. "Personal papers" are defined
as anything of a "purely private or non-public character" not related to the President's
official duties; diaries or personal notes "not circulated or communicated in the course of
transacting Government business"; and political materials not related to official duties or
the President's activity as leader of his party. Thus, H.R. 11001 exempts intrapersonal
material from retention regardless of content. Political material resulting from public
activity would be retained.
For other proposed legislation see Amend. 1926 to S. 4016, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 120 CoNG.
REC. 32290 (1974) (Percy Amendment); S. 2951, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.. 120 CONG. REc. 1867
(1974) (Bayh Bill); S. 4080, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 120 CoNG. REc. 33412 (1974) (Hruska Bill).
123. A prospective scheme would not eliminate all Fourth Amendment protection.
See note 50 supra. This Note suggests that prospective ownership of presidential material
will have to exclude a small category of intrapersonal official material, absent a more
compelling need than proprietary rights. H.R. 11001 is the only proposal to provide
this protection for presidential material. The only court to rule on the ownership issue
found that all property generated or kept in the administration and performance of
the powers and duties of the Presidency is government property. Nixon v. Sampson, 389
F. Stpp. 107, 133 (D.D.C.), dismissed as moot, No. 74-1518 (D.D.C. Sept. 21, 1977), appeal
docketed, No. 74-1533 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 18, 1977). The district court had held that the
"emoluments" clause of the Constitution, U.S. Co. sr. art. II, § 1, cl. 6, specifically pro-
hibits the President from removing material of "incalculable" value, 389 F. Supp. at
137. Under the scheme for retention developed in this Note, only official material that
reflected intrapersonal activity could be removed. It makes no sense to construe the
"emoluments clause" to prevent the return of a small amount of material imbued
with First and Fourth Amendment interests, when the President receives services that
could technically be designated "emoluments" throughout his term of office and are
not subject to constitutional attack. Op. ATr'Y GEN., supra note 6, at 5.
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